Trident warhead decommissioning continues at a slow pace, says Nukewatch

Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead arsenal continue at a baseline level and suggest that decommissioning of warheads from the Trident warhead stockpile is slowly taking place, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements for the year 2013 published by the Nukewatch network (available to download at the bottom of this article).

Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for decommissioning around three warheads per year between 2011 and 2025 to bring the UK’s total warhead stockpile down from around 225 warheads to around 180 warheads, as the government committed to do in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

However, Nukewatch stresses that sustained monitoring over future years will be necessary to confirm this.

Nukewatch is a network of individuals which monitors the UK’s nuclear weapons programme by observing the road transport of nuclear weapons, and has been watching and tracking warhead convoys for over 25 years.

The group considers that during 2013 at least two ‘live’ warhead convoys travelled between the Coulport nuclear arms depot in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield in Berkshire, most likely dispatching four warheads to AWE for maintenance, surveillance, or decommissioning, and returning two warheads to Coulport.

Britain’s nuclear warheads are moved on a regular cycle between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the South of England, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, where warheads are stored prior to deployment on Britain’s Trident submarines. By observing this cycle, it is possible to draw inferences about the level of activity of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme

Nukewatch reports that the overall picture of convoy movements during the year represents a slightly lower level of activity than over the last year, but is consistent with a minimum baseline level observed over the past few years. During the 1990s and early 2000s warheads were transported across the country on a far more regular basis as the Trident programme was implemented and older warheads were returned to AWE for decommissioning.

As well as ‘live’ convoy movements, Nukewatch notes that convoy exercises and training activities also took place during 2013, and a number of special nuclear materials convoys were observed.

 

2013 TCHD WARHEAD CONVOY LOG

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Ministry of Defence uses ‘antiquated’ trucks which should have been scrapped five years ago to transport nuclear materials

Cargoes of highly radioactive military nuclear materials are being transported along British roads in ageing Ministry of Defence (MoD) trucks which are regularly experiencing breakdowns and safety shortfalls because of delays in arranging for new vehicles to take over their duties.

Papers released under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that MoD is continuing to use special High Security Vehicles which are over 20 years old to transport military special nuclear materials to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire, where the UK’s nuclear weapons and fuel for nuclear powered submarines are manufactured, even though the vehicles were scheduled to have been replaced in 2010.

A log of safety incidents provided to Nukewatch by the Ministry of Defence in response to a Freedom of Information request reveals that the vehicles have suffered a series of breakdowns and faults since 2010.

In November 2010 a special nuclear materials convoy was forced to return to AWE Aldermaston after setting out because the clutch of the High Security Vehicle in the convoy kept slipping as a result of “wear and tear”. The convoy set out again later the same day with a replacement truck substituting for the defective vehicle.

On another convoy run in November 2012 the alternator on one of the vehicles failed. The convoy was diverted to a nearby Ministry of Defence establishment for repairs, resulting in a 50 minute delay to the journey.

Other faults were experienced in December 2010 when a tail lift failed to operate, in November 2011 when a vehicle suffered a minor fuel leak while on the road, and in June 2012 when a flat battery required a vehicle to be slave started. Each of the faults resulted in a “minor delay” to convoy journeys.

The problems have occurred despite “comprehensive HSV servicing and maintenance routines” which, according to a monthly status brief on the project to replace the vehicles, are now necessary “to minimise risk of breakdown / malfunction”.

The MoD fleet of two High Security Vehicles for the transport of special nuclear materials consists of two H-registered Seddon Atkinson vehicles which entered into service in 1991.

An assessment undertaken by MoD in 2006 indicated that the vehicles would reach the end of their operating life in 2009 – itself an extension of an out of service date previously estimated as 2003. The assessment stated that the vehicles would become “increasingly unsupportable” if operated beyond 2009.

A year later the MoD’s Nuclear Movements Integrated Project Team decided to adopt a new solution for the transport of special nuclear material containers: shipment on special pallets in another fleet of specialized vehicles built to carry nuclear warheads. The new arrangements were scheduled for “full operating capability” by October 2010, allowing the High Security Vehicles to be withdrawn from service soon afterwards.

The decision to use warhead transporters in the new role was taken despite a warning in the 2006 assessment that “the combined vehicle approach does not provide a practicable solution for a replacement HSV” because of access issues at military bases, practicalities of materials movement timetables, and MoD policy that the two types of convoy should appear different.

Delays in the programme to withdraw the High Security Vehicles from service appear to have resulted from setbacks in the preparation and approval of safety cases required to allow new vehicles designed to carry nuclear warheads to take over the transport of special nuclear material cargoes.

The Ministry of Defence has stated that the out of service date for the High Security Vehicle “depends on a number of factors” and is current;y expected to be “around late 2014 to early 2015”.

The two High Security Vehicles regularly transport special nuclear materials – plutonium, tritium, and highly enriched uranium – and nuclear warhead components between the two Atomic Weapons Establishment sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire. They also transport highly enriched uranium pellets for use in submarine reactor fuel from Aldermaston to a factory operated by Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd in Derby where fuel modules for Astute class nuclear powered submarines are manufactured.

The vehicles are also used to deliver radioactive materials and components provided by the USA to Aldermaston from RAF Brize Norton – the airhead to which they are flown across the Atlantic.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch, which monitors nuclear warhead convoys and campaigns against their risks, said: “It’s very clear that, as a result of bureaucracy and incompetence in the Ministry of Defence, deadly cargoes of highly radioactive materials are being driven round the country in unreliable, antiquated vehicles which cannot be guaranteed to deliver them safely to their destination.

“The military regularly tell the public that their nuclear programmes operate to the highest safety standards, but the evidence here shows that this is far from being the case”.

“Members of the public driving on Britain’s roads are being placed at unnecessary risk because of the irresponsibility of the admirals and civil servants responsible for running the MoD’s nuclear programme properly”.

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FOI records reveal nuclear warhead convoy safety faults

Brake failures, vehicle breakdowns, false alarms, and map-reading errors are among dozens of safety incidents which have plagued convoys carrying nuclear weapons and military special nuclear materials on Britain’s roads over the last seven years, according to documents released under the Freedom of Information Act.

70 individual safety incidents involving the convoy were recorded by the Ministry of Defence over the period between July 2007 to December 2012, according to records provided to Nukewatch by the Ministry following the request. 56 of these were classed as ‘engineering incidents’ and the remaining 14 as ‘operational incidents’.

Convoys of Trident nuclear warheads travel by road several times each year between the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport on Loch Long in the west of Scotland, where they are stored and loaded onto Trident submarines. Special nuclear materials – plutonium, tritium, and highly enriched uranium and components fabricated from these materials for use in the UK’s nuclear weapons and submarine programmes – are also transported less frequently to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment.

The most visible of the incidents recorded occurred on Monday 25 July 2011, when a convoy command vehicle broke down near Junction 20 of the M6 motorway in Cheshire late in the afternoon.

According to the convoy commander’s report, the vehicle “suffered a sudden and dramatic loss of power and was forced to pull onto the hard shoulder of the motorway together with the rest of the convoy assets”. The convoy pulled onto the hard shoulder of the motorway for repairs “causing a minor obstruction of the near-side lane”. Although the FOI papers state that the fault took just twenty minutes to repair, a post on the ‘Trucknet‘ chat forum by a trucker who witnessed the breakdown observes that two lanes of the motorway were coned off while the repairs were underway, which “caused about 10 miles of queues”.

The cause of the incident “proved to be somewhat of a mystery” because, although a fuel system failure was suspected as having caused the problem, “the vehicle had been filled prior to the operation and there was no sign of leakage”. Following the incident fuel systems across the vehicle fleet were checked and rectified.

In July 2010 a convoy strayed “unintentionally off route” as the result of an error by the escort commander. Stopping the convoy and rejoining the correct route resulted in a delay of 45 minutes to the journey time. Convoys were regularly re-routed or delayed to avoid road traffic accidents, severe weather, or heavy congestion on the route ahead, and on one occasion in March 2012 a convoy was re-routed “due to proximity of low flying” at a MoD establishment.

On another occasion a fuse box failure left the tractor unit of one warhead carrier truck unusable, requiring a spare unit to be used to complete the journey, and on another occasion the spare tractor itself broke down.

Recurring problems with warhead carrier trailer heat monitor alarms, which were triggered four times on false alerts between September 2011 and December 2012, resulted in the alarm system software needing an upgrade, and problems with ageing vehicle location systems on the warhead carriers also required installation of a replacement system.

As well as trucks carrying the warheads themselves, vehicles in the convoy security escort also suffered problems. In June 2012 a convoy was halted to investigate a “suspension system defect” in one of the armoured escort vehicles which accompany the warhead carriers. During the unplanned stop a manhole cover collapsed underneath a second escort vehicle, requiring a vehicle safety check. During a convoy run in January 2012 a gun port flap on a convoy escort vehicle “opened inadvertently”, and during the same operation a “brake fault” was discovered on a fire tender accompanying the convoy.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch, which monitors nuclear warhead convoys and campaigns against their risks, said: “Some of the safety incidents on the list provided by the Ministry of Defence were relatively serious and, had bad luck caused events to play out in a different way, could have resulted in harm to motorists or the convoy crew or damage to the deadly cargo being carried by the convoy.

“It only takes a moment’s though to see that, far from being a benign ‘insurance policy’ which keeps the public safe, nuclear weapons actually increase the risks that we all face.
“The Ministry of Defence should not be moving nuclear weapons around the country if it can’t guarantee to do so safely.”

 

 

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Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA), Nuclear Information Services (NIS), Nukewatch and CND Joint Seminar 20th September 2013, Glasgow

The NFLA have co-operated with Nuclear Information Service, Nukewatch and CND to jointly organise a seminar to consider the post-Fukushima nuclear emergency planning regime and recent concerns raised in the media over the safety of nuclear weapon convoys from Aldermaston to Faslane and Coulport. The seminar will take place in Glasgow City Chambers 10.30am – 1pm, Friday 20th September.

This seminar, kindly hosted by Glasgow City Council, will consider the impact of the Fukushima disaster in reference to current UK nuclear emergency planning guidelines and whether there are any potential gaps in these arrangements at both military and civil nuclear sites. It will also consider whether there are adequate safety arrangements in place in the event of an emergency affecting a convoy transporting nuclear weapons from Berkshire to the west of Scotland. A recent article in ‘The Guardian’ of the MOD’s ‘Exercise Senator’ raised a number of significant concerns and the seminar will highlight them.

Confirmed speakers for the seminar include Peter Burt from Nuclear Information Service, Rob Edwards a freelance journalist for ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Herald’, Jane Tallents from Nukewatch and the NFLA Secretary. We are also inviting the Scottish Government’s Civil Contingencies Unit and MOD staff responsible for guidelines around nuclear weapon convoys to speak at the seminar, or at the very least provide written statements of policy.

Please see flyer: http://www.nuclearpolicy.info/docs/events/NFLA_joint_seminar_September_flyer.pdf

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Scotland left to fend for itself during nuclear weapons accident exercise

12th June 2013

Delays and mistakes made during a major accident exercise involving a nuclear weapon would have resulted in Scotland being left to fend for itself by Whitehall government departments during a critical period in the handling of the emergency, according to an official report.

Also see Guardian report on Exercise Senator 2011

No official information about the disaster would have been available to the public for several hours after the accident, and disorganisation and delays in the medical response to the emergency meant that a seriously injured casualty who might otherwise have survived would have died.

The catalogue of errors is revealed in an internal Ministry of Defence report released on the handling of Exercise Senator 2011 -­ a rehearsal of arrangements for tackling an emergency involving a British nuclear weapon being transported along Scotland’s roads to the Trident nuclear submarine base on the Clyde. The report was released to Nukewatch following a request made under the Freedom of Information Act.

The real-life exercise took place at HMS Gannet, Prestwick Airport, Ayrshire, in September 2011, roleplaying an imaginary accident involving a nuclear weapons convoy which took place on the M74 near junction 5 at Motherwell -­ one of Scotland’s busiest sections of motorway.

Under the nightmare accident scenario, the emergency occurred when a large goods vehicle travelling north on the motorway suffered a front tyre blowout, causing it to crash through the central reservation into a nuclear weapons convoy. A truck loaded with Trident nuclear warheads swerved to avoid the accident and tipped over onto its side, and as a goods vehicle carrying road-surfacing equipment swerved to avoid the accident, its load broke loose and collided with another warhead carrier.

Two casualties died immediately as a result of the accident, seven more were injured, and between 50 and 100 drivers caught up in the incident were contaminated by radioactive material released as nuclear warheads burnt in the fire caused by the accident. A plume of radioactivity drifted away from the accident scene placing nearby homes and property at risk.

An exercise evaluation report prepared by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) concluded that there was essentially no MOD input to (and certainly no presence at) the main strategic emergency control centre until Ministry of Defence co-ordinating personnel arrived five and a half hours after the accident – a realistic timescale for an accident in Scotland?.

The lack of support from MoD created “major difficulties for the multi-agency response, which struggled to attain a meaningful understanding of the issues”. DNSR concluded that the lack of support “over such an extended and critical period” was “not acceptable”.

Scientific and technical advice provided by MoD to local civil agencies was also deemed “not adequate”, with “no apparent leadership or structure” and “repeated changes in representation” from MoD staff responsible for providing technical information, who at times disputed advice provided by local agencies.

The accident site response for treating casualties “became disorganised”, and it was “less than clear who was in charge” of medical arrangements at the scene. There was “considerable delay” in developing a plan to manage casualties contaminated with radioactivity and “significant further delay” in getting agreement send paramedics into the contaminated area to receive casualties. As a result of the delays, exercise controllers declared that a seriously injured casualty who might otherwise have survived had died.

Personnel tasked with briefing the media about the incident were misdirected to the wrong location, “which delayed any effective media response by several hours”, meaning that in a real life accident, no official information or safety advice would have been provided by the government to the media and the public.

The police were formally alerted to the accident by a fax message sent to the police headquarters, leading the exercise assessors to drily conclude that “arrangements for providing the initial written alert to the police are not adequate”.

Over 1000 personnel from 21 different government agencies took part in the exercise at various locations across Central Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, and the exercise was observed by nuclear weapons specialists from the USA and France.

Several of the government agencies which participated in the event were critical of the MoD’s preparations for the exercise, with the Scottish Government commenting that “exercise instructions were sent out too late by MoD and arrangements were finalised too late”, impacting on the level of Scottish Government involvement in the exercise. Other agencies complained that no funding had been provided by the Ministry of Defence to run the exercise and that the exercise play had started before all agencies had arrived at the mock accident site. As a result, DNSR concluded that “more systematic arrangements are required for exercise planning, particularly when engaging with many agencies.”

Councillor Bill Butler of Glasgow City Council, a former Member of the Scottish Parliament and chair of the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Scotland Forum said:
“To hear that in this exercise the Ministry of Defence was not advising senior emergency service and local authority representatives for a large amount of time, that public information provision was poor, and that the Ambulance Service were not able to deal with radioactively contaminated casualties sounds the alarm that emergency planning arrangements may not be as robust as they should be.

“I urge the Ministry of Defence to take the outcomes of this exercise very seriously and work more closely with local authorities and the emergency services to resolve these planning gaps”.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch, a national network which monitors the transport of nuclear weapons said:
“Far from being an benign ‘insurance policy’ keeping the public safe, nuclear weapons actually increase the risks that we all face.

“This exercise shows that, at the height of the crisis, Scotland would be left to fend for itself by Whitehall in the event of an emergency involving a British nuclear weapon.

“The Ministry of Defence should not be moving nuclear weapons around the roads on convoys if it doesn’t take emergency planning seriously and organise exercises properly”.

 

For more information please contact:
Nukewatch: Jane Tallents on 07778 267833 or 01968677401.
Nuclear Free Local Authorities: Sean Morris on 07771 930196 or 0161 234 3244.

Documents relating to Exercise Senator 2011 released under the Freedom of Information Act are available to download at http://nuclearinfo.org/article/transport/scotland-left-fend-itself-during-nuclear-weapons-accident-exercise (at the bottom of the article)

Notes for editors:

1. Nukewatch is a national campaign network which monitors the transport of nuclear weapons through the UK. For more details please see 192.185.186.105/~nukewatc

2. Nuclear Free Local Authorities is the local government voice on nuclear issues ­ a cross-party group of around fifty local councils which tackles in practical ways, and within their powers, the problems posed by civil and military nuclear hazards. For more information please see www.nuclearpolicy.info

3. Video footage of the nuclear weapons convoy from the Nukewatch / Camcorder Guerillas film ‘Deadly Cargo’ is available online for use by the media at: http://vimeo.com/20872194 A short animated clip from the Ministry of Defence exercise video showing an aerial view of the accident scene is available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/fvxoyla1wxn9crt/Senator%202011%20Exercise%20video.wmv

4. Nuclear warhead convoys travel between the Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire up to 6 times per year transporting nuclear warheads for maintenance and inspection.

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Nukewatch obtains convoy contract details

Nukewatch has recently obtained a copy of the Ministry of Defence contract for supporting the nuclear weapons convoy, which was released following a request under the Freedom of Information Act.

The contract is part of MoD’s much larger contract with AWE plc for operating the Atomic Weapons Establishment, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured. AWE were awarded the contract to provide convoy support when the Ministry of Defence Police took over operation from the RAF in 2000.

Under the terms of the contract AWE is responsible for garaging and maintaining convoy vehicles, and for providing key convoy staff including drivers, convoy safety officers and firefighters, and vehicle and radio fitters.

Information about contract costs has been blacked out from the document, allegedly to protect AWE’s commercial confidentiality.

You can download a copy of the contract document here: http://192.185.186.105/~nukewatc/docs/convoy_contract.pdf

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New trucks for the nuclear weapons convoy

The Ministry of Defence has taken delivery of new trucks for the road transport of nuclear warheads between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and HM Naval Base Clyde in Scotland.

The previously-used Foden Truck Convoy Heavy Duty Mark 2 (TCHD2) warhead carriers which came into service at the beginning of the 1990s are now being replaced with new vehicles comprising of Mercedes-Benz Actros tractor units and refurbished TCHD2 trailer units. The trucks are also expected to be used to transport special nuclear materials, replacing ageing High Security Vehicles previously used for this purpose.

The programme to replace the trucks was approved in 2007 and the new trucks are scheduled to be in service by the end of October 2010. Eight vehicles plus one spare tractor unit were scheduled to be ordered under the replacement programme.

The vehicles were ordered on behalf of MoD by AWE plc, which holds the contract for maintaining and operating convoy vehicles and managing certain elements of convoy operations.

Following a series of trials of different vehicle types last summer, the new trucks were seen on the road for the first time in July 2010 when a warhead convoy travelled from Burghfield to Scotland.

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Tracking the nuclear warhead convoy… A new Camcorder Guerillas film

Award winning video activist collective Camcorder Guerillas will be launching their new film about Nukewatch in November 2007. The film will uncover how fully assembled Trident nuclear warheads are transported on public roads in secret convoys, passing large centres of population such as Oxford, Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow on their journey between AWE Burghfield in Berkshire and RNAD Coulport in western Scotland.

Interviewing grassroots activists, environmental journalists and international disarmament experts as well as local authorities and fire services, about the dangers and illegalities of this deadly cargo, the Camcorder Guerillas offer an insight into an issue usually well hidden from the public. Find out how ordinary citizens in the Nukewatch network track and campaign against the convoy and its deadly cargo – and how you can help put an end to this nuclear madness.

Camcorder Guerillas productions: www.camcorderguerillas.net

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