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STOP PRESS: Debate in Scottish Parliament about Nuclear Weapons Convoys. 2nd May

The motion “Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport” lodged by Mark Ruskell MSP will be debated in Holyrood next Wednesday, May 2nd at 5pm. See full text below.

Although as a Members Debate it won’t result in a vote Mark will speak about the Nukewatch report UNREADY SCOTLAND and our request to the Scottish Government to conduct an open review of civil authorities readiness to respond to a serious accident with a nuclear weapon in transit.

The report arose from a survey that Mark Ruskell’s office conducted of local authorities that convoys pass through. The results showed the woeful lack of emergency planning for an accident with such a unique cargo – high explosives combined with radioactive material including plutonium. They seemed content to leave public safety in the hands of the MOD although it’s clear that the MOD would expect first responders including councils to take care of the public including evacuations and disseminating advice to take shelter.

We have already sent the report to all MSPs on convoy routes but to have this information formally put on record in the Holyrood chamber is important. The Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy, Paul Wheelhouse MSP will respond at the end of the debate.

If you live in Scotland please can you ask your MSPs to sign the motion and attend the debate. You can see if the convoys travel through your area by looking at the Council areas mentioned in the motion. Support from any MSP’s is helpful but it would be especially valuable if those whose constituents are put at risk by the transport of nuclear weapons could go to the debate and contribute. Hearing from you would encourage that.

It would be great to see a good attendance in the public gallery. You can book a ticket online

Or let us know you want to attend and we can meet you in the main lobby at 4.30pm with tickets.

Mark Ruskell is booking a room where we can discuss what was said afterwards and have some refreshments. Please let us know if you want to join us.

Find out more about UNREADY SCOTLAND and read the full report here.

Jane Tallents and David Mackenzie for Nukewatch.

Motion S5M-11539: Mark Ruskell, Mid Scotland and Fife, Scottish Green Party, Date Lodged: 09/04/2018

Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport

That the Parliament understands that the Ministry of Defence regularly transports nuclear weapons on public roads in convoys that pass through or close to communities in the Argyll and Bute, Dumfries and Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, East Lothian, Edinburgh, Falkirk, Glasgow, Midlothian, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, Stirling, South Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and West Lothian local authority areas; believes that there is an inherent risk in transporting high explosives and radioactive material together on public roads; understands that information on what to do in an emergency involving a nuclear reactor is regularly circulated to residents close to the Coulport and Faslane bases but that no equivalent information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route; believes that although defence is a reserved matter, it would be for the civil authorities such as police, fire and rescue and local authorities to attempt to respond to any emergency as so-called category 1 responders, and notes the view that these civil authorities must have sufficient assessments and plans in place to respond.

Check here so see if your MSPs have signed it.

Support from Scottish CND in Requesting Scottish Government Review

Nukewatch welcomes this open letter to John Swinney supporting our request for a review into the civil authorities preparedness to cope with a serious nuclear convoy accident in the report UNREADY SCOTLAND. The replies we have received so far from Paul Wheelhouse Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy can be seen here.

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

An open letter to John Swinney, Deputy First Minister with responsibility for Resilience

Dear Mr Swinney

I am writing on behalf of Scottish CND to share our concern about the continuing and regular transport of the UK’s nuclear weapons on Scottish roads. Our objection to this traffic is twofold. The movement by road of nuclear warheads is a key part of the UK’s horrifying and illegal Trident nuclear weapon system. The transport also presents immediate and unacceptable risks to the communities through which the nuclear weapon convoys pass, risks which the UK Ministry of Defence itself acknowledges and attempts to justify as acceptable in order to maintain the Trident system. Our concern has been heightened by the publication of the Nukewatch report “Unready Scotland” and the disappointing response of the Scottish government to its findings (REPORT link). The report has highlighted a general unreadiness on the part of Scottish local authorities on convoy routes to respond effectively to a serious incident, in terms of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). The report noted in particular a general failure to conduct appropriate risk assessments of the threat posed by the traffic and a complete failure to make and keep their public informed, both of which are statutory duties under the Act. While accepting that defence is reserved to Westminster and that the conduct of the convoys is a UK government responsibility, the report has recommended that the Scottish government conducts a review into the readiness of the relevant civil authorities in Scotland to effectively fulfil their statutory part following any serious incident. To date the Scottish government has not acceded to this request. Scottish CND supports the Nukewatch request for a review as a sensible and appropriate step forward. Meanwhile there are strong indications that the new UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is already having a significant impact in advance of its entry into force. Since the adoption of the Treaty, 30 financial institutions have ceased investing in nuclear weapon producers. At UN level ICAN is reliably advised that the nuclear-armed states, including the United Kingdom, are feeling the challenge that the Treaty poses to their nuclear weapon status. The treaties banning chemical weapons, cluster munitions and landmines have led the way in changing the norm around these inhumane weapons, and there are signs that the nuclear ban treaty is beginning to have the same effect.

We are delighted that a majority of Scottish parliamentarians, including the entire Scottish government, have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Pledge to work for the advancement of the TPNW. Scotland has a unique position as a significant section of a nuclear-armed state which at both popular and parliamentary level rejects that state’s possession of these WMD. This is recognised worldwide. In that context it is vital that all reasonable and constitutionally viable steps be taken to align with the Treaty.

One such step is the modest one recommended by Nukewatch. Scottish CND commends it to you.

Yours sincerely,

Jean Anderson

Scottish CND Secretary

On behalf of the Executive Committee

Public Meetings scheduled in Scotland

Could Scotland Cope with a Nuclear Weapons Convoy Crash?

EDINBURGH: 28 Sept 6pm, Godfrey Thomson Hall, Thompsons Land, St John St, Edinburgh EH8 8AQ Jointly organised with UN House
HELENSBURGH: 2 Oct 7.30pm, Guide Hall, John St, Helensburgh CND
EDINBURGH: 6 Oct 7pm, Yes Hub, 31 Lasswade Rd, EH16 6TD jointly organised with Edinburgh Yes Hub
GLASGOW: 10 October, 7pm, Rainbow Room, Friends Meeting House, 38 Elmbank Crescent, Glasgow G2 4PS, jointly organised with Scottish CND
STIRLING: 24 Oct 7pm, Stirling University, jointly organised with Stirling Uni Greens
GLASGOW: 26 Oct 12.30pm, City Chambers, George Square. Contributing to a seminar organised by Nuclear Free Local Authorities Scotland.

ALL WELCOME

The Nukewatch report “Unready Scotland” raises sharp questions about the preparedness of the civil authorities in Scotland to respond to a serious incident involving the transport by road of UK nuclear warheads, with its unique combination of high explosives and toxic nuclear materials.Its authors, Nukewatchers Jane Tallents and David Mackenzie, will set out the context for the report, its key findings, and comment on what response there has from the UK Ministry of Defence, the affected Scottish local authorities and the Scottish Government.

Nukewatch monitors and tracks the movement of British weapons of mass destruction from the atomic weapon factories in Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire to Coulport on Loch Long, where the warheads are stored and loaded onto the Trident submarines. Unready Scotland is based on a survey of Scottish local authorities on or near known convoy routes, conducted in the autumn of 2016 by the office of Mark Ruskell MSP and the observations and research by Nukewatch and other related campaigns over the years.

More information and the full report

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UNREADY SCOTLAND Report Published

Nukewatch UK has published a report UNREADY SCOTLAND : the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons.

Based mainly on a survey of local authorities on routes taken by the warhead convoys conducted by MSP Mark Ruskell in the autumn of 2016, this report scrutinises the preparedness of the Scottish civil authorities to deal adequately with any incident or accident involving the convoys that transport the weapons. In Scotland the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) governs the responses of local authorities (and other “Category 1 Responders) to any threat to public safety. The Act requires Category 1 Responders to conduct a risk assessment of potential threats and to keep the public informed. None of the councils surveyed (ie those through which nuclear warheads are transported) conduct risk assessments specifically in respect of nuclear weapon convoys when travelling on their roads. Some councils claim to rely on generic assessments conducted by their local Resilience Partnership. None of the surveyed councils informs their public about the nuclear warhead traffic. There is also no evidence that the Scottish Government has taken any active step to ensure compliance with the Act.

“Unready Scotland” also examines in alarming detail the complex and challenging practicalities that would be posed for the civil authorities in the event of a serious incident such as were envisaged in the major Exercises Senator . The report concludes that there is no evidence that these authorities would be able to cope.

The MOD make it clear that their prime concern would be to secure the weapons themselves, while the Category 1 Responders would have to manage accurate and prompt public information (including countering false stories spreading fast on social media), complex evacuations in highly populated areas, as well as making arrangements for people to take shelter in their own homes. This would all be on a scale that has not been tested in practice. The responses reported make it clear that in this context bland assurances that all is in hand are impossible to accept.

The report points out the need to take account of the changing environment affecting the convoys, such as the rapid growth in social media communication and the recently adopted UN Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. It points out that while defence matters are reserved to Westminster, community safety is wholly devolved to Holyrood. The report concludes by recommending that the Scottish Government carries out an honest and open review of the preparedness of the Scottish civil authorities.

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

Read and Download the full report

For a paper copy of the report e-mail us here

Sign the Petition asking the Scottish Government to conduct a review.

If you live in a Scottish Local Authority area on a convoy route write to your council about their response to the survey.

If you live in England a more general letter to your council with some questions can be found here

Donate to Nukewatch

Click here to get sent our Convoy Updates by email

Nukewatch reports increase in nuclear weapons transport during 2016

Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons increased significantly in 2016 when compared with recent years which suggests that modernised warheads are being introduced into service, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements published by Nukewatch (available to download at the bottom of this article).

Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for loading the first batch of newly modernised warheads on board the Trident submarine HMS Vengeance, which re-entered service during 2016 following a three year refit.

Nukewatch considers that during 2016 at least six loaded convoys travelled between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield and the Coulport arms depot in Scotland, and at least five loaded convoys travelled in the opposite direction. These are believed to have delivered a total of up to 34 refurbished warheads to Coulport and returned 28 warheads to AWE for modernisation.

Although the total number of convoy movements during the year is similar to the past four to five years, the number of convoys carrying nuclear weapons has more than doubled when compared to previous years, with a corresponding reduction in the number of training exercises.

The pattern of convoy movements observed is consistent with an operation to return warheads equivalent to a single submarine’s complement to AWE for refurbishment. In December 2015 the Trident submarine HMS Vanguard entered Devonport dockyard for a three year refit, prior to which nuclear weapons would have been unloaded from the submarine. At the same time HMS Vengeance left Devonport following a refit, and re-entered service soon after completing a controversial Trident missile test-firing in June 2016, during which an unarmed missile had to be destroyed mid-flight.

Convoy movements suggest that over the first half of the year enough warheads were refurbished by AWE to allow HMS Vengeance to re-enter service in the second half of the year with a largely, if not fully, refurbished complement of warheads.

Production of the modernised and upgraded UK Trident Mark 4A was scheduled to have commenced sometime in 2015 and Nukewatch considers that the convoy movements observed in the first part of 2016 represented an operation to move the first of the Mark 4A upgraded warheads to Coulport prior to loading onto HMS Vengeance.

Over the period 2011 – 2014 a surplus of warheads was returned to AWE when compared with the numbers delivered to Coulport. Nukewatch considers that this is evidence that Trident warheads have been decommissioned at a slow rate in line with a commitment to reduce the number of UK nuclear warheads which was announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Over the last two years this trend has ceased and it appears that there has been a suspension of warhead decommissioning work.

Britain’s nuclear warheads are moved on a regular cycle between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the South of England, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, where warheads are stored prior to deployment on Britain’s Trident submarines. By observing this cycle, it is possible to draw inferences about the level of activity of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. However, Nukewatch stresses that their figures can only represent an estimate of the true picture.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch said: “The pattern of warhead convoy movements which we saw last year paints an alarming picture. The evidence suggests that not only are there a greater number of these deadly cargoes on the roads, but that the government is introducing modernised and even more lethal Trident warheads into service.

“While the rest of the world is meeting at the United Nations to draw up a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons, the UK government is unilaterally and illegally modernising its weapons of mass destruction”.

Download annual logs of convoy movements for 2015 and 2016 here:

Convoy log 2015

Convoy log 2016

Nuclear Information Service report on nuclear weapons accidents

‘Playing With Fire: Nuclear Weapons Incidents & Accidents in the UK’ is a new report by the Nuclear Information Service that discusses the accident record of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme over its 65 year history, looking across the full scope of the programme and describing the most significant incidents in detail. It includes 22 incidents that have taken place during the road transport of nuclear weapons, including vehicles overturning, road traffic accidents, and breakdowns. For more information and to download the full report see here.

NIS has also released a video telling the story of one of the case studies in the report. This is the story of when a truck containing two nuclear warheads skidded off an icy road and overturned, told by people who were there at the time and featuring news footage from the following day.

Campaigners Question Local Police Preparedness for Nuclear Convoy Incident

NUKEWATCH SCOTLAND

Press Release: 10th October 2016

CAMPAIGNERS QUESTION LOCAL POLICE PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR CONVOY INCIDENT

The citizen monitoring group Nukewatch, which observes and reports on the movement of nuclear weapons within the UK, has written to Scotland’s top police officer to express concern about the apparent unpreparedness of local police to respond to any incident involving the convoys. See letter text below.

The worry has arisen from recent conversations between campaigners and local police officers, as nuclear weapon convoys have been passing, which have indicated that the officers concerned are wholly unaware of the nature of the traffic and its attendant risks.

Nukewatch understands that local police are called to attend when convoy personnel notice protesters at the roadside or following the convoy in cars. Local traffic police can also be involved in traffic management as the convoys pass through.

In their letter to Chief Constable Philip Gormley the campaigners say:

“This is troubling on two counts. These officers could be attending an emergency situation involving a convoy and be completely unprepared, by their lack of specific knowledge and training, to take appropriate action. That is a question of critical competence. Secondly, they might be exposing themselves to particular and serious risks of which they had not been advised. That represents a serious failure of an employer’s duty of care to employees.”

David Mackenzie said:

“It is frankly astonishing that Police Scotland can be so complacent in the face of the serious and potentially catastrophic risks posed by the transport of nuclear warheads on public roads. It seems that they are content to let the MoD deal with any incident in spite of the fact that accident simulation exercises in the series Exercises Senator have repeatedly highlighted poor inter-agency co-ordination in acted-out scenarios. Under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) so-called First Responders, such as the emergency and health services must carry out risk assessments of identified threats. It appears that Police Scotland are failing to comply with the Act.”

Contacts:

David Mackenzie 07876593016

Jane Tallents 07778267833

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

The Chief Constable

Police Scotland
PO Box 21629
STIRLING FK7 1EN

Dear Philip Gormley,

Police Scotland officers and nuclear weapon convoys

Nukewatch is a citizen monitoring group which observes and reports on the movement of nuclear weapons and weapon-related nuclear materials within the UK.

We have a particular concern to raise with you. During our observations of recent nuclear weapon convoys travelling to and from Coulport we have had roadside conversations with a number of Police Scotland officers who have attended as we watched the convoys pass or followed the convoys in our own vehicles. What appears to happen is that convoy personnel alert local police to our presence.

Our concern is that a number of these officers have been completely and genuinely unaware of the nature of the traffic. This is troubling on two counts. These officers could be attending an emergency situation involving a convoy and be completely unprepared, by their lack of specific knowledge and training, to take appropriate action. That is a question of critical competence. Secondly, they might be exposing themselves to particular and serious risks of which they had not been advised. That represents a serious failure of an employer’s duty of care to employees.

Does Police Scotland have any kind of process for giving all officers the essential information about nuclear weapon convoys? Does Police Scotland provide training to its officers on how to respond in the case of an emergency involving a nuclear weapon convoys, so that their actions will mesh effectively with those of the Ministry of Defence in the context of the LAESI guidelines?

We look forward to hearing from you

Nukewatch

New report highlights warhead convoy accident record

Convoys which transport the UK’s Trident nuclear warheads have been involved in a series of collisions, breakdowns, and equipment failures, according to a new report by an award-winning journalist.

The report, written by the Sunday Herald’s Rob Edwards and published by the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), puts a spotlight on the safety record of high security convoys which regularly carry nuclear weapons across the UK.

According to previously unpublished information revealed in response to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act, convoys transporting defence nuclear materials and warheads were involved in 24 ‘operational incidents’ and 19 ‘engineering incidents’ over the period January 2013 to July 2016.

Over this period the convoy was involved in three minor collisions: twice in May 2013, when two convoy vehicles collided with each other and when a convoy escort vehicle collided with a parked civilian vehicle, and again in January 2014, when an escort vehicle collided with a car at a Ministry of Defence (MoD) base during a rest stop.

In September 2015 one of the trucks which transports nuclear weapons lost power and broke down soon after leaving a military site, and convoy escort vehicles twice broke down and were declared unserviceable during convoy journeys in November 2013 and July 2015. Adverse weather affected convoy journeys in November 2013, forcing a route change, and in January 2014, when a rolling police blockade was set up to safeguard the convoy during snowy conditions, and the convoy was stopped by protesters on three occasions.

The new revelations bring the total number of reported safety incidents affecting the nuclear convoy since 2000 to 180. This is in addition to eight accidents which are known to have taken place between 1960 and 1991, the most serious of which occurred in January 1987 when a convoy vehicle carrying nuclear warheads skidded and overturned on an icy road in Wiltshire.

The report lists a series of credible accident scenarios that could trigger fires, explosions or a breach of containment, resulting in the release of plutonium and other radioactive materials from warheads. Evidence cited from an MoD report suggests that in extreme circumstances an accident could even trigger an “inadvertent yield” – a nuclear reaction leading to a large-scale release of radiation short of a full nuclear explosion. A terrorist attack on a nuclear convoy, according to the MoD, could cause “considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function effectively as a sovereign state”.

The report simulates the results of an accident involving a nuclear weapon in five places through which the warhead convoy has travelled: Birmingham, Preston, Wetherby, Newcastle and Glasgow. In each case the people, hospitals, schools, universities, roads, railway stations and airports that could be contaminated and disrupted are identified, assuming that an accident would spread contamination up to ten kilometres from the scene of the crash, depending on which way the wind was blowing.

In Birmingham, for example, a nuclear convoy crash on the M6 at Spaghetti Junction near the city could put more than 1.3 million people at risk of radioactive contamination. Within a ten-kilometre radius there are over 400 schools, 38 railway stations and 18 hospitals that could be disrupted.

The report quotes independent nuclear engineer John Large as warning that a multiple crash and fire involving a warhead carrier would pose a significant – and plausible – risk to the public. “The inclusion of a flammable chemical tanker in the pile-up would add to the ferocity and, particularly if the incident occurred in a longish bridge underpass or similar, fire temperatures would be very demanding on the containment of the warhead carriers,” he said.

If the containment is breached, high explosives could catch fire or explode, he warned. “Once that happens then the enriched uranium and plutonium components will also be consumed by fire and, without effective containment, liberate some very fine plutonium dioxide particles.” The consequences of this would be very hard to mitigate and very long lasting, potentially contaminating significant areas of land and posing long term health impacts.

The report states that although emergency exercises run by the MoD rehearse disaster scenarios in which multiple crashes lead to fires, explosions and the spread of radioactive contamination over cities, post-mortem reports from six exercises reveal that the MoD and the emergency services would have serious difficulties dealing with such disasters. Post-mortems “make the same points year after year”, because many of the same problems keep recurring, suggesting that “lessons are not learnt”, and that “issues with delays, communications and co-ordination are rediscovered every time”, which “does not bode well should there ever be a serious accident”.

Download the ICAN report here.