UNREADY SCOTLAND

the critical gap in our response
to the transport of nuclear weapons

Ministry of Defence - “The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function as a sovereign state” ¹

¹ Internal Review of FOI request 4 May 2006 by David Wray, MOD
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A report by Nukewatch UK into nuclear weapons transport and community safety in Scotland.

Nukewatch monitors and tracks the movement of British weapons of mass destruction from the atomic weapon factories in Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire to Coulport on Loch Long, where the warheads are stored and loaded onto the Trident submarines. Nukewatch also monitors the movement of nuclear weapon-related materials.

Nukewatch is not a membership organisation. It is a network of individuals who campaign against nuclear warhead convoys, mainly because the convoys are part of a system of weapons of mass destruction, but also because we believe that communities which could be potentially affected by the convoys should be aware of their existence and the risks they pose.

The information we gather from the monitoring process is used to inform the public, to provide elected representatives with the data that can help them ask important parliamentary questions, and to share information about nuclear weapons at international level.

Written by David Mackenzie and Jane Tallents June 2017

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Mark Ruskell MSP and his staff for enquiries to local authorities, the results of which are the basis for this report, Peter Burt from the Nuclear Information Service for advice and guidance, Jeanne Brady for proof reading and all Nukewatchers who have monitored nuclear convoy movements and raised concerns about them for the last 34 years.
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SCOTTISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON NUCLEAR CONVOY ROUTES

1 - West Dumbartonshire
2 - East Dumbartonshire
3 - North Lanarkshire
4 - Glasgow
6 - Renfrewshire
UNREADY SCOTLAND

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Problem
Up to eight times a year, a convoy of heavy trucks travels between the Aldermaston and Burghfield atomic weapon plants in Berkshire to RNAD Coulport on Loch Long. Apart from the occasional training run, or when carrying weapon material such as tritium, these trucks will be carrying nuclear warheads in at least one direction of the trip. The movement of warheads could be for maintenance or replacement.

Unique Traffic
This traffic is unique on Scotland's roads, because the nuclear warheads transported in these convoys consist of nuclear materials surrounded by high explosives – a dangerous combination.

Regulations governing the civil transportation of radiological material explicitly forbid the carrying of explosives in the same vehicle as radiological material for the obvious reason that a detonation of the explosive would disperse the radioactive material. The MOD itself says that the high explosive in a Trident warhead would have an impact radius of 600 metres. The radioactive material in the warheads includes both plutonium and uranium, with a potential dispersal range of at least 5 kilometres. In addition to this, warhead materials include a number of toxic and hazardous substances.

The risk acceptability gap between civil transport and the nuclear weapon convoys is therefore vast. Further, the unique nature of this risk to community safety rationally entails specific attention among the range of threats to public safety.

Response of the Public Authorities
The other dimension of the problem lies in the response of the relevant civil authorities. Community safety and emergency planning in Scotland is covered by the Civil Contingencies Act (Scotland: 2004). The Act identifies a number of organisations as Category 1 Responders: Police Scotland, Fire and Rescue Services, the Scottish Ambulance Service, Local Authorities and the Health Service. As regards the Category 1 Responders, the focus of this report is on the local authorities on or near known convoy routes in Scotland, on the grounds that local authorities are the agencies that residents will expect to be active in and

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2 The Radioactive Substances (carriage by Road) (GB) Regulations of 1974 (No. 1735), Section 6h states “No person shall ... carry in a vehicle which is carrying radioactive material any explosive substance within the meaning of the explosives act 1875”

informed about community safety in their area. Responsibility to ensure compliance with the Act rests with the Scottish Government, as exercised through its Resilience Division. The contention of this report is that local authorities are failing in their duties under the Act in respect of nuclear weapon convoys and that the Scottish Government is in turn failing to ensure compliance.

The situation is complicated by the Scotland Act. Defence issues are reserved to the Westminster Government. Taken at face value, this will mean that neither local authorities nor the Scottish Government have any say whatsoever on the question of warhead transport. However, there is an inherent and relevant contradiction within the devolution settlement. Community safety is a devolved matter and the legislation governing it, the Civil Contingencies Act, while it does mention “national security” in the context of public information, nowhere rules that defence-related threats are outwith its scope. The public authorities in Scotland, including the Scottish Government, have devoted much time and effort into the Ready Scotland framework for responding to civil emergencies, but they also have a clear duty to face up to this contradiction.

This report is based on three main resources: a survey of Scottish local authorities on or near known convoy routes, conducted in the autumn of 2016 by the office of Mark Ruskell MSP; a number of other smaller-scale enquiries, and the observations and research by Nukewatch and other related campaigns over the years. Although the focus of this report is on Scotland because of the particular circumstances of devolution as well as increased public awareness here, communities on or near convoy routes in England are facing exactly the same risks.
2. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Origins of Local Authority Responsibility for Public Safety
During the First World War, bombs were dropped onto civilian areas of Britain from airships and planes for the first time and in 1924, the Air Raid Precautions Committee (ARP) was set up to look at how to protect residential areas from aerial attacks. In 1938, the UK Government went on to establish the Civil Defence Service. In addition to the ARP, the Civil Defence Service included fire services, fire watchers, first aid posts and industry. The organisation of civil defence was the responsibility of local authorities and during World War II, thousands of volunteers were involved in preventing injury by issuing gas masks and pre-fabricated air-raid shelters and maintaining the blackout as well as putting out fires, rescuing people from bombed buildings and administering first aid after air raids. ‘Report and Control’ teams gathered information and directed rescue, medical and decontamination teams to the scenes of reported bombing and if necessary requested extra resources from neighbouring areas. Due to these measures, the number of deaths and casualties fell dramatically.

The Cold War
The Civil Defence Service was disbanded in 1945, but many of the duties of the service were later revived as part of the Civil Defence Corps in 1949 with the onset of the Cold War. The focus now shifted to dealing with the aftermath of a nuclear attack. The planning was much the same as for conventional bombing, with the added roles of radiation monitoring and scientific advice within the local headquarters. By March 1956, the Civil Defence Corps in Great Britain had 330,000 personnel but was stood down in 1968, partly as a result of an understanding within government of the futility of attempting to use conventional civil defence techniques to cope with the immense destruction expected during a nuclear war. However, civil defence continued to be funded to protect central government functions – about £45 million a year by 1983/84.

Protect and Survive
In the late 1970s, the government produced Protect and Survive, a public information series on civil defence intended to inform British citizens on how to protect themselves during a nuclear attack, and consisting of a mixture of pamphlets, radio broadcasts and public information films. It was intended that these would be distributed and broadcast only if a nuclear attack was imminent but after a lot of requests for information, the pamphlet “Protect and Survive” was made publicly available in 1980. It had very little scientific information about radiation, but included advice on such things as building a shelter using doors and cushions inside a house, how to store drinking water in the bath and what to do with the bodies of anyone who dies before help arrives.

4 Protect & Survive- www.atomica.co.uk/main.htm
Rather than providing the intended reassurance, the advice convinced many more people that nuclear war was something they never wanted to experience and the 1983 CND demonstration in London drew 300,000 people. The public saw efforts at civil defence as fundamentally ineffective against the powerful destructive forces of nuclear weapons, and therefore a waste of time and money.

At the same time, nuclear doctrine moved towards “mutually assured destruction” which meant that any nuclear exchange would be so great as to make survival and the continuation of government functions impossible and the idea of civil defence was quietly shelved.

Civil Contingencies – Additions and Omissions

The years 2000–01 saw mass flooding and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, as well as fuel protests, which caused widespread disruption to the supply of petrol. The Civil Defence Act of 1948 was not adequate to cope with these three events and the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, announced a formal review into emergency planning arrangements. The resulting Civil Contingencies Act 2004 eventually replaced the Civil Defence Act.

The Civil Contingencies Act obliges the civil authorities to identify potential threats and to list them on public registers. Parallel to the re-focusing of emergency planning away from preparing for a nuclear attack onto threats considered to be more immediately acute, the risks attendant on nuclear weapons transport have been largely hidden from the public.

3. THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT

Nuclear Weapon Convoys and Scottish Local Authorities – the Survey

The survey was conducted by MSP Mark Ruskell in the autumn of 2016. Those local authorities through which nuclear weapon convoys regularly pass, or pass close by, were asked to complete a short questionnaire. The information being sought was whether the local authorities had conducted risk assessments in relation to the convoys and whether the local authorities communicated with their residents about the transport of nuclear weapons through their communities.

Local authorities, along with the police, health and emergency services, are classed as “Category 1 Responders” in terms of the Civil Contingencies Scotland Act (2004). Under the

5 Appendix: Local Authority Survey
Act, it is the duty of Category 1 Responders to conduct risk assessments of all identifiable threats and risks to public safety. It is also their duty under the Act to inform the public about these threats and risks.

Overall, the answers to the survey indicate that in all cases Scottish local authorities on or near convoy routes are failing in their duties under the Act in relation to nuclear weapons convoys and their associated risks.

**Informing the Public**

Category 1 Responders, including local authorities, have a duty under Part 6 of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) to warn, inform and advise the public about possible emergencies or guidance on what to do in the event of an emergency involving a nuclear warhead convoy, as well as the response to these emergencies. None of the surveyed local authorities takes any proactive step, either independently or as part of their Resilience Partnership, to inform the public about the risks associated with nuclear weapons convoys, or to offer reassurance about how the council and its partner organisations would respond to any incident. Some local authorities instead direct enquirers to the MOD’s Local Authorities and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) which only deals with information to a potentially affected public following an incident involving the convoys. In contrast, the local authorities, in collaboration with the other organisations in a regional Resilience Partnership, publish lists of other threats on the relevant Resilience website together with indications of any planned response, for example flooding or an explosion at an industrial site.

**National Security and Necessary Alarm**

The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) offers two restraints in regard to informing the public. One duty is to avoid conveying “sensitive information”. This covers information deemed harmful to national security or public safety, or information that might prejudice commercial interests or personal privacy. There is also the duty to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily.

The national security proviso has an obvious relevance to the transport of nuclear warheads. Given the possibility of terrorist activity, there is a common-sense case against revealing up-to-the-minute live information about convoy movements. There is, however, no justification on the grounds of national security for not informing the public about the existence of the convoy traffic and its attendant risks. Though not widely circulated and only known by a small, if growing, proportion of the public, the existence of the convoy traffic is already in the public domain.

As a somewhat vaguely drafted piece of legislation, the Act does not give any guidance on the question of the tension between “national security” and public safety. In the

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7 www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/861633/east_crr_v1.2.pdf for example

8 Part 8, Section 39

9 Part 6, Section 24
context of any incident involving a nuclear weapons convoy, the indications from previous accidents involving the convoy and scenarios from emergency exercises are that the priority of the convoy personnel would be to secure the weapons, with local public safety coming a distinct second. This means that a prudent Category 1 Responder will independently consider this tension and devise their policy on public information accordingly.

**Necessary Alarm**

On the question of unnecessary alarm, it is worth reflecting on the shocked reaction of most people when first informed about nuclear weapons convoys. The simple fact that these trucks carry nuclear bombs on public roads is enough to cause very serious concern, amounting to alarm. Part of that alarmed response is about the fact that the convoys and any contingency planning are surrounded by secrecy. The general lesson is that in the modern era a public authority must establish and maintain public trust by openness. Although no proactive effort is made by the authorities to draw public attention to it, LAESI documentation, which provides information about the nature of nuclear weapons transport, (which many people have found a cause of alarm), is itself in the public domain. This further undermines any argument that a genuine attempt to inform the public about the convoys would be unnecessarily alarming.

It follows that neither national security nor the unnecessary alarm considerations should prevent local authorities from proactively informing their public in general terms about the transport of nuclear warheads through their jurisdiction.

**Inconsistency in Regard to Public Information**

The public information policy governing emergency planning in relation to radiation hazards from the Clyde naval and armament bases is quite different from the post-emergency approach governing the nuclear weapons convoys. The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) require nuclear-licensed site operators to inform residents within an “offsite emergency planning area” of precautions which they should take to protect themselves in the event of a radiation emergency.

The Clyde Off-site Emergency Plan\(^{10}\) includes the requirement to proactively inform residents in the area once every three years about how they should respond in a radiological emergency. The same pre-emergency information is also issued to residents around the naval dockyard in Devonport, Plymouth, and around civil nuclear installations, such as power stations. There is absolutely no reason why the same pre-emergency information should not be made


Also relevant are the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) applicable to fixed nuclear-related sites. Berkshire Council has an informative approach in regard to Aldermaston/Burghfield: www.awe.co.uk/app/uploads/2014/07/REPPIR_May-2013.pdf
available to potentially affected residents on regular nuclear weapons convoy routes.

The Culture of Secrecy
It is worth noting that such public awareness and knowledge of nuclear weapons convoys as exists is due almost entirely to the work of citizen monitors, who have over the years observed and recorded convoy movements, matched these observations against other information, prompted parliamentary questions and engaged in public education. This has led to the gradual erosion of the secrecy that originally surrounded the traffic, to the extent that its existence is now openly acknowledged by the MOD.

However, secrecy remains the default position and that culture still infects all the public authorities concerned. This culture is clearly demonstrated by another of the Category 1 Responders, Police Scotland. As recently as January 2017, during a trial in Dumbarton Sheriff Court of a peace protester who lay down in the road to stop a nuclear weapons convoy in Balloch,11 two of the three Police Scotland witnesses said under oath that they had no idea what the trucks might contain. This matches the experience of protesters who talk to Police Scotland officers at the roadside while observing the passage of a nuclear weapons convoy. Very frequently, the officers are unaware of what the trucks are for and are thus completely unprepared to respond effectively to a potential traffic incident involving the convoy. If an organisation is ready to withhold relevant information from its own officers, how can we expect it to be open with the general public?

Ready Scotland
Ready Scotland’s own advice on good practice includes “pre-event” information, and the use of the Resilience Partner websites in conveying it:
“Consider communication across all phases of an emergency There have been a number of suggestions about how warning and informing can be defined as a series of stages. In previous guidance there was mention of three distinct phases of communication. 1. Public awareness of risk (pre-event), and preparedness steps where relevant 2. Public warning (at the time of the event or when one is imminent) 3. Informing, advising and engaging with the public (immediate and long-term post event).”

And:
“Use Community Risk Registers
Efforts should be made to raise awareness among the general public about what risks are likely to affect them and what steps they could take to mitigate the consequences, ahead of events happening. Community Risk Registers are published to help communities better understand the risks they face. They offer an effective starting point for engaging with communities on their perceptions of risk, and for explaining the context of risk along with the self-help measures they can take.”12

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11 Trial of Brian Quail, 25th January 2017

In the case of nuclear weapons convoys, there is no official and accessible “pre-event” information. Members of the public will naturally see their local council as having a key role in keeping them informed in matters of community safety. As things stand in Scotland, affected local authorities are failing their public in regard to the risks associated with nuclear weapons convoys.

Assessing the Risks
When the term “risk assessment” is used in official documentation relating to community safety, it means identifying a threat to the community and weighing up its likelihood and possible impact.

Such assessments should combine two factors: the likelihood of an event and the potential impact of an event. In the case of nuclear weapons convoys, even if the likelihood of an event is remote, the potential severity of an event will elevate the risk element to High.\(^\text{13}\)

In fact, ranking the likelihood of a convoy event as low or remote is in itself controversial, given the fact that public roads are used and that the risk is extended over time. In every case (with one partial exception\(^\text{14}\)), the surveyed Scottish local authorities have failed to conduct risk assessments in relation to the specific risks presented by nuclear weapons convoys. Many responses simply say that no risk assessments have been conducted. Others rely on generic risk assessments conducted within their Resilience Partnerships. These may cover radiological mishaps but do not in any way deal with the unique combination provided by the convoys – the presence in one vehicle of both high explosive and radioactive material. The high explosive itself has an impact radius of several hundred metres, and the alpha radiation, if dispersed by the high explosive, will have a downwind plume of at least 5 kilometres.

One might speculate that the local authorities may be relying on the Ministry of Defence to conduct the necessary risk assessment. This would be an invalid abdication for two reasons. The local authority cannot rely on the MOD for an offsite response to any incident and, logically, the risks attached to that aspect of the response must also be assessed. Secondly, the actual content of any MOD risk assessment, as may exist, is not available to local authorities, let alone the general public. Any claim by a local authority that it has assessed the risks on the basis of adopting homologating an unseen risk assessment by the MOD would be ridiculous.

Failure
Potentially affected local authorities in Scotland are failing to comply with their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act both in respect of public information and risk assessment.

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\(^{13}\) See [https://www.cumbria.gov.uk/eLibrary/Content/Internet/535/600/415991630.pdf](https://www.cumbria.gov.uk/eLibrary/Content/Internet/535/600/415991630.pdf)

\(^{14}\) Stirling Council has conducted a risk assessment related to stopovers by nuclear weapon convoys at the DSG site within the city. Further the Council has not conducted any specific risk assessment of the convoys while on the move through Council territory.
4. Local Authority and Emergency Services Information

Five of the local authorities we surveyed referred to the MOD’s publicly available LAESI document. The Ministry of Defence publishes this document, *Local Authority and Emergency Services Information*, to “provide information for the emergency services (Police, Fire and Ambulance) and Local and Health Authorities on contingency arrangements to be implemented in the unlikely event of an emergency, including those arising out of terrorist acts, during the transportation of nuclear weapons and Special Nuclear Material”. The first edition was published in the late 1980s, after many years of the MOD’s refusal to even acknowledge the existence of road transport of nuclear weapons. At that time, local authorities, notably Strathclyde Regional Council, heavily criticised LAESI, pointing out the many difficulties that they would experience in trying to carry out LAESI’s guidance.

The MOD has just released the eleventh edition of LAESI (published July 2017); although there have been changes to the document over the years, these have mostly been to update the structures for communications between the myriad agencies who could potentially be involved in trying to deal with such an incident. The basic advice for responding at operational level remains the same. LAESI lays out what action should be taken after an accident and who would be responsible for that action. It does not include any information about how accidents could be avoided, nor does it supply any risk assessment.

The Reality of a Serious Accident

So what would happen if there was a serious accident – say a big motorway pile-up involving a fuel fire, or an engine falling from an aircraft onto the convoy? Although unlikely, these were the scenarios in convoy accident Exercise Senator 2011 and 2005, so it is plain the MOD itself considers these scenarios feasible. Let’s consider the operational practicalities of dealing with a major incident by examining LAESI and publicly available information about convoy accident exercises, and by using Nukewatch’s combined experience of monitoring the convoy’s routes for over 30 years.

Convoy Personnel Response

Immediately after an accident, nuclear weapons convoy security personnel, MOD police and armed marines would secure the area immediately. Their most pressing duty would be to form a cordon around the convoy vehicles, particularly the warhead carriers. This would be their priority. The condomed area could be quite extensive, especially if multiple vehicles were involved, or if one of them had crashed over a bridge or flyover parapet. Security personnel would probably try and move all members of the public who were

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15 LAESI (edition 11)
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Mobile to the outside of this cordon and would certainly prevent anyone from entering.

Medics travelling with the convoy would attend to casualties, but they do not necessarily have full training and equipment. We have anecdotal evidence that in a real-life incident when a member of the public was seriously injured, the medic travelling with the convoy was refused permission to give medical aid.¹⁶

First Responders
First Responders would soon arrive at the scene. They may have been told en route that this incident involves nuclear weapons, if the area police control room was notified in advance of the convoy’s whereabouts and the controller dealing with the call has realised the significance of it. Also after an accident both the personnel travelling with the convoy and the MOD’s Joint Operations Cell (a unit, based in Abbey Wood in Bristol, which monitors the convoy’s movements) will pass an initial alert to the control rooms of the police, fire and ambulance services in the affected area (LAESI 6.3a). Up until Exercise Senator 2011, this notification was done by fax, but the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator report¹⁷ questioned whether fax was still the most appropriate method of communication, and it may have been updated. Since then, the eight Scottish regional police forces have merged into Police Scotland. We know that funding issues have led to control rooms being under pressure at times.¹⁸ It is certainly possible that some First Responders would be attending an emergency incident with a nuclear weapon convoy after receiving a number of 999 calls, without necessarily being supplied with the full information they need for dealing with that incident.

In the case of a nuclear weapons convoy incident, when First Responders arrive at the scene, the MOD Incident Co-ordinator travelling with the convoy should make themselves known to the Responders, although this could be difficult if multiple emergency vehicles arrive from different directions simultaneously. Emergency services are to approach the incident site from downwind. From many places along the convoy route, this approach could involve a long detour. If the convoy was on a major road at the time of the incident, it is likely that


traffic in the local area will rapidly become congested, adding to the difficulties responders would face in reaching the location.

The Scottish Ambulance Service Special Operations Response Team is equipped to deal with special situations, but is not likely to be first on the scene. The Scottish Ambulance Team has bases in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen, and could be over an hour away from some convoy routes. In the scenario for Exercise Senator 2011, Scottish Ambulance Service personnel refused to go inside the cordon or transfer contaminated casualties to hospital to the point where one of the exercise casualties "died". 19 (from LAESI edition 10 onwards it now spells out that rescue personnel should enter the cordon).

If an emergency incident includes the fact that the high explosive in the warhead has detonated, then First Responders entering the vicinity of the accident may well be wearing respiratory protection that includes a full face mask, but they should be taking caution not to stand on weapon debris, a caution they may find difficulty in fulfilling:

LAESI 6.3f advises “In addition to pieces of radioactive and toxic material, this might include pieces of explosive, possibly sensitised, which might have the appearance of wax, chalk or gravel.”

When the first LAESI was released, a Strathclyde fire officer dressed in full protective equipment remarked on how difficult it would be to spot explosive materials under these circumstances.

These and other problems that would be faced in the initial response to an accident show that special risk assessment and planning needs to be done, and all First Responders who are potentially going to be called to a convoy accident need to be aware of these plans.

**Evacuation of 600-metre cordon**

LAESI 4.4 “In the event of a serious convoy accident the MOD will advise the Police that anyone within 600m should be evacuated as an immediate action to provide protection from the conventional effect of the emergency, in particular from the potential for a conventional explosion.”

Evacuation would need to be done quickly and could be a very large operation, involving many people. For example, around the Edinburgh bypass this could include housing at Oxgangs, Colinton or Sighthill, ad primary schools at Clovenstone or Juniper Green, as well as Glencorse Primary next to Glencorse Barracks where the convoy takes a break. In Glasgow, heavily populated residential areas through the south side of the city alongside the M74 and M8 might need to be evacuated. In Stirling, a large part of Raploch housing scheme would be within a 600m cordon. All the routes that the convoy takes throughout Scotland include residential areas, schools, businesses and busy shopping streets.

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19 Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator assessment Senator 2011 Page 5
The practicalities of having enough police officers or volunteers to knock on all the doors in a 600m radius of a nuclear weapons convoy incident, and also have transport and reception centres available, when the vast majority of the general public knows nothing about this are very challenging. While an incident plan can be easily drawn up for a fixed site, the ability to quickly identify who is in danger from any point on many miles of convoy route needs extensive planning. Local Authorities will hold detailed information about residents, but as some of the Local Authorities who have convoys passing through seem to take the attitude that it is nothing to do with them their preparedness to share that may be impeded.

Ready Scotland’s “Guide to Emergency Planning for Community Groups”\textsuperscript{20} emphasises the need to make a plan based on knowing what risks a community faces. It suggests checking the local Community Risk Register for information. There are now three registers covering Scotland for the West, the East and the North. The West register mentions nuclear power stations and major military sites, but none of the registers include nuclear weapons convoys on their major transport routes.

Although there have been exercises in Scotland which practice evacuation of small areas, for example a police firearms exercise at Braehead shopping centre in Glasgow in January 2016 (carried out when the centre was closed),\textsuperscript{21} or a chemical alert exercise at the old Bangour Village Hospital in West Lothian in October 2013,\textsuperscript{22} nothing has been practised on the kind of scale envisaged by LAESI.

And while with “Industrial Site” incidents in the Community Risk Registers, the possibility of a need to evacuate or take shelter is included, there is no information about the specific risks from radioactive releases.

People who live near industrial plants, power stations or on floodplains have some awareness that evacuation may be a possibility. Although often unprepared for an emergency, when there is a knock at the door to tell them they must leave, they would understand the reason. People totally unaware of nuclear weapons travelling within 600m of their communities can’t begin to think about how they might respond.

**Taking Shelter**

If a convoy accident resulted in the high explosive in one of the warheads being detonated or at serious risk of going to detonate, or if fire was engulfing the weapon, then the radioactive material in the warheads may have been released.

\textsuperscript{20} http://www.readyscotland.org/media/1057/guide_to_emergency_planning_for_community_groups.pdf

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-35417190

\textsuperscript{22} http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/local-news/bangour-village-hospital-hosts-chemical-2605419
LAESI Key Emergency Actions for a Nuclear Weapon Emergency where this has happened advise “Shelter public to 5 kilometres downwind in a 45° arc centred on the wind direction.”

The experts who can establish that the nuclear weapon in transport is in a safe condition and not in danger of exploding do not travel with the nuclear weapons convoy. During the Exercise Senator 2011 scenario, these experts did not arrive at the incident site until five-and-a-half hours after the start. Therefore, the calculation should be that responsible authorities should immediately implement a sheltering policy if any of the warhead carriers is involved in any accident involving impact or fire.

The MOD’s suggestion of contamination only spreading 5km downwind is a very conservative figure.

In his report “Nukes of Hazard: The Nuclear Bomb Convoys on our Roads”, Rob Edwards said:

“In his 1990 report on convoy accidents, the nuclear engineer John Large argued that contamination could spread at least 40 kilometres. He pointed out that test burnings of plutonium in the early 1960s at the Maralinga nuclear testing range in Australia had caused an inhalation hazard between 27 and 56 kilometres away. According to Large, the US military assumes that radioactivity from an accident could spread over 40 or 50 kilometres. Depending on the severity of the accident and the prevailing weather conditions, he thought emergency countermeasures in the UK would extend to tens of kilometres from the accident site.”

In the case of an incident involving a nuclear weapons convoy, once a Strategic Coordinating Group HQ is set up, there would be advice from a Scientific Advisory Group, which would include meteorologists, but everyone in Scotland knows how quickly the wind can change strength and direction, making the claim that the contamination would be limited to a neat 5km in a 45° arc very optimistic at best.

However, even if we just consider the MOD’s suggested 5km, 45° arc “Shelter zone”, a glance at a map reveals that many thousands of people could be involved. Large residential areas in Edinburgh, Glasgow and every other Scottish Local Authority area the convoy passes through could potentially be subject to the sheltering advice. The affected area could also include many schools, and hospitals, as well as venues where large numbers are gathered in the open air, such as sports stadiums and music festivals.

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23 Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator assessment Senator 2011 Page 7

In the summary of Emergency Actions in LAESI, the key points stated for the public announcement are:
- **People in the following areas (... name locations ...) should take these precautions to minimise the hazard from inhaling or ingesting radioactive particles.**
- **Go indoors and stay there.**
- **Close all doors, windows and ventilators.**
  - Switch off any ventilation or air conditioning systems drawing air from outside the building.
  - **Do not leave the shelter of a building until advised that you may do so by the police.**
  - **Do not try to collect children from school unless told to do so. The school authorities will look after them.**
  - **Keep tuned to local radio/TV (names stations, frequencies).** Emergency services and MOD forces are responding to the emergency. You will be informed when these precautions are no longer necessary.”

The police have the initial responsibility for telling people to take shelter, but both they and other people drafted in to help with this would be faced with many questions from very worried people.

- People who rely on visits from carers would have concerns if they were unable to enter the shelter zone.
- Although children are supposed to be left at school, there is no evidence that schools are prepared for this and instinctively parents may want to collect them.
- Many modern buildings don’t have windows that open but rely on ventilation systems. These can only be closed down for a while before people begin to suffer. Hospitals in particular could be affected.
- None of the guidance gives any kind of timescale for how long shelter restrictions would stay in place.
- Most people have a basic fear of radiation and would be looking for reassurance about the long-term health implications.

Arrangements for dealing with all these issues would go way beyond the remit of Police Scotland and so it is clear that Local Authorities would need to be involved from an early stage. This is why the Local Authority’s response to our survey is so alarming.

There is also a real risk that self-evacuation may occur over a wider area, as news of the incident spreads and local residents fearful for their safety decide to get away from the area. During the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the USA in 1979, self-evacuation was a major concern. Large-scale self-evacuation runs the risk of adding to traffic congestion and general confusion, impeding the emergency services’ response, and possibly exposing evacuees to contamination. The risks of self-evacuation could be reduced if residents are properly informed about risks and given advance information about suitable precautions to take, including advice to stay put unless advised otherwise.

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25Evacuation Behaviour at Three Mile Island, Robert A Stallings
http://www.ijmed.org/articles/448/download/
Communication

While there would be information broadcast on local TV and radio stations, many people would turn to social media. Although there is still no mention of this at all in LAESI it is well recognised in a Preparing Scotland document “Warning and Informing Scotland: Communicating With The Public”.  

Police Scotland has a following of 236,000 on Facebook and 159,000 on Twitter, which is a good base for beginning the process of sharing information. However, the nature of social media is such that groups of people can discuss current events and share opinions in their own discrete circles and, as Nukewatch has found, incorrect information is often stated as fact. There would inevitably be a delay in issuing an official statement, and by then, people would have been disseminating all sorts of uninformed advice on social media. Some of this would be overstating the consequences of the incident but equally worryingly there would also be those saying that there is nothing to fear and that caution is not necessary.

Exercises

Some information has been put into the public domain (mostly in response to Freedom of Information Act enquiries – FOIs) about convoy accident exercises, notably those given the codename “Senator”. Although the exercises are designed to highlight difficulties, the same issues occur time and again, even when a lot of time and resources are put into preparation. Either lessons are not being learned, or coping with a serious nuclear weapons convoy accident would be very difficult, however much the incident is rehearsed in theory. As officials from AWE Aldermaston warned after Exercise Senator 1996, a real accident might be much harder to deal with: “We are possibly misleading ourselves into believing that we can manage the very real logistical problems of an actual response.”

27 If a Nuclear Convoy Should Crash, New Scientist 13 Nov 2005 Rob Edwards
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8304-if-a-nuclear-convoy-should-crash/#bx252530B1
5. THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT

What the Defence Policy Unit Said
Following the Holyrood election of 2015, the Scottish Scrap Trident Coalition wrote to all the members of the new Parliament asking, among other requests, that there should be an investigation of the safety issues raised by the transport of nuclear warheads across Scotland. Although the letter was directed to individual MSPs, there was a response on behalf of the Scottish Government from the Defence Policy Unit.

They wrote:
“With regard to your request for the Scottish Government to undertake a public investigation of the risks of nuclear weapon/warhead convoys, nuclear weapon transportations remain a reserved matter. While the Scottish Government expects any such transportation to be carried out safely, securely and in line with regulatory requirements and has made this expectation clear to the UK Government, we do not have the powers required to undertake such an investigation.

The key responsibilities for the effective management of emergencies in Scotland are outlined in The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005. This places a number of legal requirements on Category 1 Responders (Police Scotland, Scottish Fire and Rescue Services, Local Authorities etc.) which include: the duty to assess risk, to maintain emergency plans, to communicate the public and to share information for the transportation of nuclear weapons.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) produces the publically available document - Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI); the Scottish Government is consulted as part of the regular review process. This document sets out the arrangements for responding to accidents involving nuclear warhead convoys, and is reviewed on a regular basis.”

The Defence policy Unit’s reply is a vivid illustration of the pickle the Scottish government finds itself in regard to nuclear weapons convoys. It begins with a trenchant restatement of the reservation of defence to Westminster, but the very next paragraph makes it clear that the responsibility for responding to the threat of an incident is not restricted to Whitehall. The responsibilities that fall on Category 1 Responders, as outlined in the Civil Contingencies Act, are being largely ignored and the Scottish Government, upon which the enforcement of compliance falls, is paying no attention, to the extent that it does not even offer guidance to these Responders, as the Act enables it to do.28 They then mentions LAESI, which, as we have established, is of limited value to Category 1 Responders in attending to the duty of care they have towards their residents.

28 Part 3 Para 11
What the Minister Said

There is further evidence of the Scottish Government’s confusion on the issue in a presentation given by Paul Wheelhouse MSP, Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy at a Parliament event on 9th December last year. Wheelhouse said that the Scottish Government would have “off-site” responsibility for responding to an incident involving nuclear weapons transport. By “site” he presumably means the immediate surroundings of the convoy and the warheads, for, as we have already shown, the focus of the MoD will be on securing the weapons themselves. It will fall to the civil authorities to deal with public safety beyond that perimeter. All the indications are that these civil authorities, the Category 1 Responders and the Scottish Government itself, are wholly unprepared to discharge that responsibility.

The Minister went on to describe a welter of high-level emergency response groups that would oversee any convoy accident. In contrast, the evidence of the survey of local councils and the direct experience of Nukewatch is that they have little practical effect whatsoever in ground-level emergency response. The Minister further sought to reassure his audience:

So, I want all of what I have said on this to reassure you that, despite our very strongly held view that Trident nuclear weapons, and indeed all weapons of mass destruction, should have no place in Scotland and indeed the wider World, we take our responsibilities regarding resilience arrangements for nuclear incidents extremely seriously and we work very closely with UK Ministers, the MOD and other agencies to ensure that, to the best of our abilities, we can minimise the risk to the people of Scotland and our tremendous natural environment.”

In the face of the reality, this reassurance is difficult to accept.

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7. CONCLUSIONS

The Changed Environment
This report has identified significant recent changes in the practical, statutory and political environment relevant to nuclear weapons convoys. There is the Civil Contingencies Act (Scotland: 2004) and the unarticulated and unresolved tension between that Act and the devolution settlement. As regards nuclear weapons, there is the growing focus globally on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, a focus not only on the catastrophic consequences of any use of the weapons but also on the impact of all aspects of their manufacture – from uranium mining, and historic atmospheric testing, to the risks involved in transportation.\(^{30}\) It is this focus that has spurred the UN impetus for a global nuclear weapons ban treaty. There has been a sharp growth in social media activity, particularly as provoked by the independence referendum and its aftermath. This latter development has greatly increased public awareness and concern about the convoys and has obvious relevance to the issue of safety. The combination of the contradictions, the connection to the global ban treaty and the increased public alertness leaves the Scottish Government facing a serious question. Does it continue to be satisfied with the status quo in the face of the increasing and increasingly widespread understanding of the threat posed by the warhead transport, or does it address the situation openly?

The position of Nukewatch is clear – we do not want the transport of horrific weapons of mass destruction no matter how safe the process is perceived to be made. But while these weapons are forced on us as part of a nuclear-armed state, let us at the very least confront the community safety issues. Waiting for an incident to spur us into action would be to wait too long.

Recommendation
As regards the response of the Scottish civil authorities to the risks presented by nuclear weapons convoys, we believe that continuing as at present, with perhaps minor adjustments, is not a responsible option. We also acknowledge that the very clear constraints of the Scotland Act make a direct confrontation with the Ministry of Defence unlikely. Yet a way forward between these two extremes needs to be found.

One way forward is for the Scottish Government to urgently head up a review of the civil authority response to the threat of an incident or accident involving the nuclear weapons convoys. The review panel would include representatives from the Ministry of Defence, COSLA, Police Scotland, Fire and Rescue and the NHS in Scotland, but it should also take evidence and testimony from independent experts on nuclear matters, as well as from expert civil society organisations, such as Nukewatch and the Nuclear Information Service. The review’s report must be made public.

Appendix

Survey of Scottish Local Authorities regarding their response to Nuclear Weapon Convoys

Conducted by Mark Ruskell MSP from autumn 2016 to spring 2017. Councils surveyed are those near on or near to known convoy routes. For ease of reading council responses are in bold except for the additional information from Stirling Council which retains the original format.

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ARGYLL AND BUTE COUNCIL

1. Has Argyll and Bute Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

This has been addressed within a number of risk assessments covering community impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events which may bring about the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards and radioactive material from any source.

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this?

The last assessments were conducted in April 2016.

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

Assessments were conducted jointly with members of the Argyll and Bute Local Resilience Partnership.

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

The methodology applied was that of the Resilience Preparedness Assessment framework as devised by Scottish Government Resilience Division.

I have to advise that this information is otherwise accessible to you at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419549/20150331_2015-NRR-WA_Final.pdf and I therefore must refuse your request in terms of Section 25 of FOISA. These assessments cover a wide spectrum of impacts informed by the UK Government’s National Risk Register and the range of potential emergency scenarios it describes.


5. Has Argyll and Bute Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

I have to advise that this information is otherwise accessible to you at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information and I therefore must refuse your request in terms of Section 25 of FOISA. Information concerning arrangements that will be implemented by the Ministry of Defence and emergency responders in event of an emergency involving the transportation of defence nuclear materials is available to the public via https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information
Information concerning the impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events involving the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards or radioactive material from any source is available via www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/864542/west_crr_version_1.2.pdf which forms the Community Risk Register for the geographic area covered by the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership. A link to this site and Scottish Government’s Ready Scotland website www.readyscotland.org/are-you-ready/ are available on the Council’s website.

6. If Argyll and Bute Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

Communication routes are as noted above with the first led by Ministry of Defence and the other hosted by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service’s website on behalf of Scotland’s emergency responder organisations.

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Argyll and Bute Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

No changes to policies or procedures. As a category 1 Responder, defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Council is obliged to maintain a generic emergency plan applicable to any emergency scenario, should that involve the transportation of defence nuclear materials then generic arrangements will be augmented by those described in the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document.

8. Has Argyll and Bute Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

I have to advise that the information you requested is information not held by the Council and as such I must refuse your request in terms of Section 17 of FOISA.

However, in line with the duty placed on the Council in terms of Section 15 of FOISA, I can advise that the Councils are not notified of convoy movements so we hold no information in this regard.

SCOTTISH BORDERS COUNCIL

1. Has the Scottish Borders Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? No

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? N/A

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? N/A
4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology? **N/A**

5. Has the Scottish Borders Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

6. If the Scottish Borders Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has the Scottish Borders Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response? **No correspondence or communication has been received.**

8. Has the Scottish Borders Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys? **Scottish Borders Council are not aware of this as it is a matter for Police Scotland. They can be contacted on foi@scotland.pnn.police.uk**

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**DUMFRIES AND GALLOWSY COUNCIL**

1. Has Dumfries and Galloway Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

*Dumfries and Galloway Council participate in the assessment of Risk within the wider context of the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership. This activity is led and coordinated within the partnership by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service.*

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this?

*The latest West of Scotland Resilience Preparedness Assessment was submitted to Scottish Government in March 2016.*

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

*We refer to our previous answers.*

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

*Risk in Resilience terms is assessed using the Resilience Preparedness Assessment process, as provided by Scottish Government.*
5. Has Dumfries and Galloway Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

Dumfries and Galloway Council has not communicated with the public specifically on this subject. As part of the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership we cooperate with multi-agency partners in assessing a range of risks / hazards, as part of submitting a Resilience Preparedness Assessment to Scottish Government and the publication of a community risk register.

6. If Dumfries and Galloway Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

The results of Resilience Preparedness Assessment work are published as a Community Risk Register, available at www.firescotland.gov.uk/your-safety/community-risk-register.aspx

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Dumfries and Galloway Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

Dumfries and Galloway Council has not made any specific changes to its policies and procedures in this regard.

8. Has Dumfries and Galloway Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

Dumfries and Galloway Council has not been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys.

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EAST DUMBARTONSHIRE COUNCIL

1. Has East Dunbartonshire Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

This has been addressed within a number of risk assessments covering community impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events which may bring about the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards and radioactive material from any source.

2 If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this?

The last assessments were conducted in April 2016

3 If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?
Assessments were conducted jointly with members of the Argyll and Bute Local Resilience Partnership.

4 If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

The methodology applied was that of the Resilience Preparedness Assessment framework as devised by Scottish Government Resilience Division. These assessments cover a wide spectrum of impacts informed by the UK Government’s National Risk Register and the range of potential emergency scenarios it describes. |


5 Has East Dunbartonshire Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

Information concerning arrangements that will be implemented by the Ministry of Defence and emergency responders in event of an emergency involving the transportation of defence nuclear materials is available to the public via - |

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information

Information concerning the impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events involving the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards or radioactive material from any source is available via

www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/864542/west_crr_version_1.2.pdf

which forms the Community Risk Register for the geographic area covered by the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership. A link to this site and Scottish Government’s Ready Scotland website

www.readyscotland.org/are-you-ready/ are available on the Council’s website.

6 If East Dunbartonshire Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members| of the Local Resilience Group?

Communication routes are as noted above with the first led by Ministry of Defence and the other hosted by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Services’ website on behalf of Scotland’s emergency responder organisations.

7 What specific changes to its policies and procedures has East Dunbartonshire Council made in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?
No changes to policies or procedures. As a category 1 Responder, defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Council is obliged to maintain a generic emergency plan applicable to any emergency scenario, should that involve the transportation of defence nuclear materials then generic arrangements will be augmented by those described in the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document.

8 Has East Dunbartonshire Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

Councils are not notified of convoy movements so we hold no information in this regard.

EAST LOTHIAN COUNCIL

1. Has East Lothian Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? **N/A**

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology? **N/A**

5. Has East Lothian Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

6. If East Lothian Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has East Lothian Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant Exercise Senator?

**No Specific changes have been highlighted**

8. Has East Lothian Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

**No. This is a matter for Police Scotland who will not inform ELC of any nuclear weapon convoys.**
THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL

Q1. Has Edinburgh Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

A1. The City of Edinburgh Council has not carried out an independent assessment of the risks to Council residents specifically relating to the transportation of nuclear weapons. As a partner of the Lothian and Borders Local Resilience Partnership and the East of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership, the City of Edinburgh Council, along with other Category One Responder Organizations in the local area, is required by the Scottish Government to implement and develop risk assessment, capability analysis and development, measuring and developing risk preparedness assessments as part of the Scottish Resilience Framework Cycle. As part of this process, the Lothian and Borders Local Resilience Partnership and the East of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership each produce publicly available Community Risk Registers. The Community Risk Registers provide information on the methodology, evaluation and analysis of the key risks that may impact on the local population. Copies of these documents are attached for your information.

Q2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this?

A2. Please see answer to question 1.

Q3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

A3. Please see answer to question 1.

Q4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

A4. Please see answer to question 1.

Q5. Has Edinburgh Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

A5. The City of Edinburgh Council has not communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated specifically with the transport of nuclear weapons.

Q6. If Edinburgh Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

A6. Please see answer to question 5.

Q7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Edinburgh Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?
A7. The City of Edinburgh Council, along with a number of Local Authorities and Agencies in the former Strathclyde Emergencies Coordination Group (SECG) participated in the MOD led, multi agency Exercise Senator in 2011. Exercises in the Senator programme of events, aimed at testing the response to a nuclear weapons transport incident, are held on a regular basis in different parts of the United Kingdom.

There have been no specific changes to the City of Edinburgh Council's resilience policies or procedures directly linked to the outcome of Exercise Senator 2011.

Q8. Has Edinburgh Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

A8. The City of Edinburgh Council is not consulted regarding the passage of nuclear weapons convoys in its area and is not aware of any change in frequency.

FALKIRK COUNCIL

1 Has Falkirk Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

2 If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? **Not Applicable**

3 If an assessment has been conducted, was this done independently or jointly with another member or members of the Local Resilience Group? **Not Applicable**

4 If an assessment has been conducted, what was the methodology? **Not Applicable**

5 Has Falkirk Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

6 Has Falkirk Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? Was this done independently or jointly with another member or members of the Local Resilience Group? **Not Applicable**

7 What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Falkirk Council (made) in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MOD exercise in accident response? **None – the Council is not aware of any geographically relevant MOD exercises in this regard.**

8 Has Falkirk Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys? **No – The Council is not made aware of such passage.**
THE CITY OF GLASGOW COUNCIL

1. Has Glasgow City Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys

No. However, this has been addressed within a number of risk assessments covering community impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events which may bring about the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards and radioactive material from any source.

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this

The last assessments were conducted in April 2016.

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group

Assessments were conducted jointly with members of the Glasgow and East Dunbartonshire Local Resilience Partnership.

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology

The methodology applied was that of the Resilience Preparedness Assessment framework as devised by Scottish Government Resilience Division.

These assessments cover a wide spectrum of impacts informed by the UK Government’s National Risk Register and the range of potential emergency scenarios it describes.


5. Has Glasgow City Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys

Information concerning arrangements that will be implemented by the Ministry of Defence and emergency responders in event of an emergency involving the transportation of defence nuclear materials is available to the public via -

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information

Information concerning the impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events involving the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards or radioactive material from any source is available via www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/864542/west_crr_version_1.2.pdf
which forms the Community Risk Register for the geographic area covered by the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership. A link to this site and Scottish Government’s Ready Scotland website www.readyscotland.org/are-you-ready/ are available on the Council’s website.

6. If Glasgow City Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group

Communication routes are as noted above with the first led by Ministry of Defence and the other hosted by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service’s website on behalf of Scotland’s emergency responder organisations.

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Glasgow City Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response

No changes to policies or procedures. As a category 1 Responder, defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Council is obliged to maintain a generic emergency plan applicable to any emergency scenario, should that involve the transportation of defence nuclear materials then generic arrangements will be augmented by those described in the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document.

8. Has Glasgow City Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys

In accordance with Section 17 of the Act we would advise you that the information you are looking for is not held by the Council. Neither does anyone else hold it on our behalf. Accordingly we are unable to comply with this part of your request. This is because Councils are not notified of convoy movements.

MIDLOTHIAN COUNCIL

1. Has Midlothian Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

Not aware of this having been carried out.

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? N/A

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? N/A

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology? N/A
5. Has Midlothian Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

6. If Midlothian Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Midlothian Council (made?) in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

   **Midlothian Council has not participated in a MoD Nuclear Weapons Convoy exercise and has not been involved in any discussions in relation to learning points from exercises held in other geographical areas.**

8. Has Midlothian Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

   **No. We are not notified of convoy movements.**

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**NORTH LANARKSHIRE COUNCIL**

1. Has North Lanarkshire Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

   **I regret to advise you that the information sought is not held by this authority and in terms of Section 17 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, I must advise you of this.**

   **To be of some assistance, I can advise that contingency arrangements surrounding the transportation of nuclear weapons by road/convoy are lead by the Ministry of Defence through the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation. Further information regarding Nuclear Accident Response Organisation is available via the following link:- https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nuclear-emergency-planning-and-atmospheric-testing-programme**

   **The contingency arrangements to be implemented by the Ministry of Defence, a Government Department, Emergency Services, Health Authorities and Councils in the event of an emergency involving the transport of defence nuclear materials, are described in a document which is authored and widely promoted by the Ministry of Defence in the public domain and across the UK’s emergency response community which is also available at the above link.**

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? **n/a**

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **n/a**
4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology? n/a

5. Has North Lanarkshire Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

North Lanarkshire Council have made no such communication with the public.

6. If North Lanarkshire Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

n/a

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has North Lanarkshire Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant Exercise Senator?

North Lanarkshire Council was last involved in such an exercise in September 2011. Noting that the Council’s Corporate Contingency Plan is the overarching document, no policy/procedure changes resulted from the outcomes of that exercise.

8. Has North Lanarkshire Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

No records are held that indicate either the frequency of such convoys or whether there has been any change in their frequency and in terms of Section 17 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 I must advise you of this.

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**RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL**

*Nuclear weapon convoys*

I am providing notice that under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 that the Council does not hold the information requested and so, is unable to comply with your request. I can advise that Renfrewshire Council is not notified of the transport of nuclear convoys through the local authority. We understand that Police Scotland may be notified.
SOUTH LANARKSHIRE COUNCIL

Has South Lanarkshire Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

This has been addressed within a number of risk assessments covering community impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events which may bring about the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards and radioactive material from any source.

· If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this?

Such assessments were conducted in April 2016.

· If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

Assessments were conducted jointly with other members of the Local Resilience Partnership.

· If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

The methodology applied was that of the Resilience Preparedness Assessment framework as devised by Scottish Government Resilience Division.


Has South Lanarkshire Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

Information concerning arrangements that will be implemented by the Ministry of Defence and emergency responders in event of an emergency involving the transportation of defence nuclear materials is available to the public via https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information

Information concerning the impacts envisaged from transport disruption and events involving the release of pollutants including chemicals, biological hazards or radioactive material from any source is available via www.firescotland.gov.uk/media/864542/west_crr_version_1.2.pdf which forms the Community Risk Register for the geographic area covered by the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership. A link to this site and Scottish Government’s Ready Scotland website www.readyscotland.org/are-you-ready/ are available from the Council’s website.
If South Lanarkshire Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group?

Communication routes are as noted above with the first led by the Ministry of Defence and the other hosted by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service’s website on behalf of Scotland’s emergency responder organisations.

What specific changes to its policies and procedures has South Lanarkshire Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

No changes to policies or procedures. As a Category One Responder, defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Council is obliged to maintain a generic contingency plan applicable to any emergency scenario; should that involve the transport of defence nuclear materials then generic arrangements will be augmented by those described in the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document.

Has South Lanarkshire Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

Councils are not notified of convoy movements so we hold no information in this regard.

STIRLING COUNCIL

1. Has Stirling Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

Stirling Council conducted a risk assessment on Nuclear Convoy Rest Stops in 2013. This assessment specifically addressed any risk associated with a rest stop at 51st Brigade, Forthside and not the transport of nuclear weapons itself.

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? 2013

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? Independently

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology?

Stirling Council use a standard risk methodology, considering impact, likelihood and key evidence available to us. We referred to the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information (LAESI) document written by the Ministry of Defence.
5. Has Stirling Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys?

No – However, Stirling Council is aware of its duty under REPPIR Regulations to provide information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency.

6. If Stirling Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? N/A

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has Stirling Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

There have been no specific changes to our policies and procedures. The Council’s Emergency Management Framework is generic in nature and takes an ‘all-risks’ approach. It focusses on mitigating the consequences of any emergency and ensuring continuity of service delivery to its residents and caring for those affected.

8. Has Stirling Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys? No

Additional - Risk Assessment
1. Overview
Risk Description
Nuclear Weapons Convoy Rest Stop

Risk Sub Category
Rest Stop at 51 Brigade Forthside. This risk assessment supplements the MOD risk associated with the convoy and specifically addresses any additional risk associated with the rest stop.

Date of Assessment 04\10\16
Review Date 04\10\17

2. Key Evidence
a) Local
The primary logistical movement of Defence Nuclear Material (DNM) is between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, England, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot RNAD Coulport in Argyll, Scotland (part of HMNB Clyde). DNM is also sent back from Coulport to AWE to be serviced.
This transport route takes it through the Stirling area and has a rest stop for approximately 1 hour at 51 Brigade, Forthside. The convoy is in a secure MOD facility and is subject to the same level of security by Military Police as when mobile.

b) Scotland/UK etc
Movements of DNM are kept to the minimum necessary to meet operational requirements. Rigorous safety procedures are implemented during all such operations.
The limited movement of DNM together with inherent safety features and procedures lead to the conclusion that the probability of a transport emergency leading to a radiological hazard is highly unlikely. There has never been an accident involving Defence Nuclear Material in the UK that has led to, or come anywhere near leading to, the release of radioactive material into the environment. (LAESI V10)

3. Additional Details
The limited movement of DNM together with inherent safety features and procedures lead to the conclusion that the probability of a transport emergency leading to a radiological hazard is highly unlikely.
The MOD retains a capability to respond in the event of an emergency during the transport of defence nuclear assets.

Police forces are notified at least 24 hours in advance of a convoy being routed through their area; this enables them to advise the convoy about any local traffic problems. Police forces may advise fire brigades of the presence of the convoy if it is moving into the vicinity of a fire brigade operation.

Movement of DNM by road is done using Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) carriers as part of a large convoy of MOD vehicles with escort provided by Military Police. The convoy is made up of a highly trained crew which includes a first aid team, fire crew, mechanics and personnel equipped to monitor for radiological hazards. Immediate Response Forces (IRF) are embedded within the convoy.

A potential risk of moving nuclear weapons is terrorist attack - MOD does not disclose operational movements of DNM convoys as this may assist potential terrorists to plan an attack.

4. Overall Assessment

Existing Controls in Place:

Local Authority
Care for People Plan.
Other Organisations
Police Scotland Response arrangements
Scottish Fire and Rescue response arrangements
Scottish Ambulance Service response arrangements
NHS Forth Valley Major Incident Plan
Secure MOD facility.
MOD convoy security and response arrangements.
LAESI

Additional Risk Treatment Required  None
Assigned risk Priority  Low
Given that the convoy is at rest within a secure MOD facility and retains the same level of security, it is assessed that the rest stop presents no additional risk in terms of the convoy. It may be argued in fact that the risk to the convoy is reduced whilst in this facility.
WEST DUMBARTONSHIRE

Under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, West Dunbartonshire Council does not hold any information on any of the above questions.

Under Section 15 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 – our duty to offer advice and assistance, I would advise that nuclear convoys are managed by the Ministry of Defence, Police Scotland and the Scottish Government. This matter is dealt with nationally with the risk assessment being done at a national level and covered in the CRRs (Community Risk Registers).

WEST LOTHIAN COUNCIL

1. Has West Lothian Council conducted any assessment of the risks to council residents associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

2. If an assessment has been conducted how recent was this? **N/A**

3. If an assessment has been conducted was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

4. If an assessment has been conducted what was the methodology? **N/A**

5. Has West Lothian Council communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys? **No**

6. If West Lothian Council has communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated with the transport of nuclear weapon convoys was this done independently or jointly with another member or other members of the Local Resilience Group? **N/A**

7. What specific changes to its policies and procedures has West Lothian Council in response to the outcomes of the most recent and geographically relevant MoD exercise in accident response?

West Lothian Council has not participated in a MoD Nuclear Weapons Convoy exercise and has not been involved in any discussions in relation to learning points from exercises held in other areas

8. Has West Lothian Council been aware of any significant change to the frequency of the passage of nuclear weapon convoys?

The council is not informed of any convoy movements
UNREADY SCOTLAND: The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons
Web: www.nukewatch.org.uk/
e-mail: spotters@nukewatch.org.uk
Facebook: NukewatchUK
Twitter: @nukewatchuk