Category: Nukewatch

US nuclear bombs were delivered to Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July as part of NATO plans to deploy new battlefield nuclear nuclear weapons intended for war-fighting in Europe.

A United States Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft prepares to unload nuclear weapons at Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July.  Credit: Nukewatch UK

The flight

The arrival of a special flight transporting the bombs was observed by Nukewatch UK, who judge that the evidence publicly available from our observations and flight-tracking data now supports the conclusion that nuclear weapons are based at the Lakenheath US air base in Suffolk. This article explains how the weapons were brought to Lakenheath by the US Air Force and sets out the evidence which indicates they are now stationed at the British base.

Shortly after 7 am local time on Tuesday 15 July a giant C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, flight number RCH4574 (‘Reach 4574’), assigned to the US Air Force’s 62nd Airlift Wing left Joint Base Lewis–McChord, its home base in Washington state. The 62nd Airlift Wing is an elite, highly trained transport unit which serves as the US Air Force’s Prime Nuclear Airlift Force: the only Air Force section tasked with the role of supporting the US Department of Defence and Department of Energy with their nuclear airlift operations. The aircraft undertaking the flight was a C-17 with the serial number 08-8200, flying on high priority mission with the air force mission number PAM112271196.

The aircraft flew across the continental United States to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico – the hub of the US Air Force’s nuclear operations, where the largest nuclear weapons storage facility in the world is located: the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). KUMMSC stores a significant portion of the US nuclear arsenal, including gravity bombs and warheads.

At Kirtland the aircraft almost certainly loaded up with a cargo of anything up to 20 newly manufactured B61-12 nuclear weapons – a new, modernised version of the US Air Force’s principal nuclear gravity bomb with greater accuracy than older variants of the weapon. Manufacturing of the B61-12 variant was completed in December 2024 and the weapon is currently being rolled out on deployment. Whilst at Kirtland the aircraft was parked on Pad 5 – the section of the airbase designated for handling hazardous cargoes. Other aircraft at the airport were given a warning not to overfly the aircraft on Pad 5 for a period of over five hours, which ended only once the C-17 had departed.

Mid evening local time on Wednesday 16 July Reach 4574 took off, with the pilot reminding the ground controller that the aircraft has “haz cargo” on board. The aircraft flew through the night across the Atlantic Ocean, rendezvousing with two KC-46 tanker aircraft from Pease Air National Guard Base and McGuire Air Force Base to refuel over the ocean east of New York.

In a co-ordinated operation, a second C-17 aircraft (aircraft number 09-9211, flight number RCH4205, mission number PAM112472196) also left Lewis-McChord on 15 July and flew to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany (stopping briefly at Lakenheath) to be on standby in the event of a failure or emergency involving the primary aircraft. This standby aircraft may have been loaded with nuclear emergency response equipment for dealing with an accident involving the primary aircraft.

Reach 4574 approached the UK flying south of Ireland, then flew up the Bristol Channel, cut across north Devon, and flew north west along a corridor taking it close to Oxford and Milton Keynes, but avoiding overflying major centres of population. The plane landed at Lakenheath air base at 12.50 local time.

Unloading the bombs

Nukewatch UK was able to observe the aircraft landing and unloading from outside the Lakenheath base. During the unloading operation base security was at an unusually high level, with USAF security patrols and police cars undertaking patrols inside the base’s security fence and plain-clothed (but badged) personnel from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations patrolling outside the base.

After landing the aircraft taxied to an area of the airbase known as ‘Victor Ramp’ – a location towards the centre of the base which is one of the areas designated for loading and unloading hazardous cargoes. During the entire unloading operation the aircraft was accompanied by a US Air Force fire tender, stationed alongside the right wing of the aircraft, and the tender also did a sweep along the runway before the aircraft landed. Security vehicles surrounded the unloading area and a number of vehicles approached the aircraft for the unloading operation, deploying close to its rear drop-down ramp. Following unloading a convoy of several vehicles moved very slowly with red lights flashing to a protected aircraft shelter near the unloading area and disappeared from sight behind the shelter. Among the vehicles seen unloading the aircraft were MHU83 Aircraft Aerial Munitions Lift Trucks, used by the US Air Force for loading and unloading munitions from aircraft, and certified for use with nuclear weapons.

Whilst Reach 4574 was at Lakenheath no other flights flew from the base and a strict ‘no fly’ restriction was in place for a 2.5 nautical mile radius around the base in the Lakenheath Aerodrome Traffic Zone area. The aircraft departed from Lakenheath at the end of the afternoon on Friday 18 July and flew straight back to Lewis-McChord.

Photos of flight Reach 4574 landing at Lakenheath and unloading its cargo accompany this article (please see below). Nukewatch UK believes that this C-17 aircraft was transporting a batch of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion are given below.

US nuclear weapons in Europe

Lakenheath air base is no stranger to nuclear weapons, and hosts F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning aircraft, both of which are certified to carry B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. During much of the Cold War nuclear weapons were stored at Lakenheath but in 2008 they were quietly removed from the base following consolidation of the US nuclear arsenal in Europe. Since 2022 nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath, including hardened aircraft shelters and a ‘surety dormitory’, has been upgraded, giving rise to speculation that nuclear weapons would be returning to Suffolk.

The 62nd Airlift Wing regularly conducts Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions across the Atlantic to transport materials and equipment to air bases in Europe which support NATO’s nuclear mission in Europe, under which B61 bombs are stored at US bases in Europe and bases of European nations which take part in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements with the US. Nukewatch has been actively tracking these flights for three years, and has used archived tracking data to analyse flights since the beginning of 2020. Over this period missions have included occasional operations which have been unusually complex, involving up to seven aircraft as stand-bys and for in-flight refuelling. In addition to operations involving nuclear weapons, the unit also conducts missions transporting special nuclear materials which visit several NATO nuclear bases in Europe in sequence, and also conducts missions involving training with ground personnel at several nuclear bases.  

It is possible that the earliest of these missions were training and rehearsal flights for the delivery of new B61-12 nuclear bombs to Europe, with more recent flights actually transporting the nuclear bombs across the Atlantic for deployment at bases in Europe. Nukewatch has observed that Lakenheath has been involved in many of these missions, initially as a location for basing a stand-by aircraft in Europe – possibly for use by a nuclear emergency response team. More recently Lakenheath appears to have been involved in a series of ‘work up’ exercises and security drills involving aircraft from 62 Airlift Wing to prepare the base for the arrival of nuclear weapons, culminating in a large-scale exercise over two days on 10 – 11 June 2025 which may have been a dress rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation.   This chart gives an indication of the frequency of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions to Europe since 2020:

Schematic schedule of US Air Force Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to NATO nuclear bases in Europe since 2020.

B61s: Transport of B61 nuclear weapons.

SNM: Special Nuclear Materials (Tritium)

T&E: Training and evaluation

Source: Observations and deductions by Nukewatch UK.

 

The day before flight Reach 4574 landed Lakenheath air base held a ‘quiet hour’ from 09.00 – 10.00 am – a session where all base personnel are briefed by senior officers on important matters. It is likely that the briefing took place to inform staff at the base that Lakenheath had been formally ‘stood up’ for its nuclear role and to explain arrangements for the delivery operation the next day.

It can be expected that Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to Lakenheath and other European nuclear weapons bases will continue on a regular basis for the foreseeable future. These flights are necessary to deliver materials required for the B61-12 nuclear programme (for example tritium, a radioactive gas involved in boosting a nuclear explosion which has a relatively short half-life and needs regular replenishment); to transport loads to and from the US for servicing and maintenance; and for emergency, security, and crew training exercises.

It is important to understand that the delivery of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath has nothing to do with the recent announcement by the Prime Minister that the UK will purchase a small number of F-35A nuclear-capable aircraft for the Royal Air Force. The UK has not yet purchased these aircraft and a long period of training and certification would be mandated by the US authorities before the RAF was deemed competent to take part in NATO’s tactical nuclear mission. As yet doctrine and operational arrangements for any RAF nuclear role do not appear to have been developed.

What we think

Speaking on the delivery of US B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath, Juliet McBride of Nukewatch UK said:

“The new nuclear bombs which are now based at Lakenheath are entirely under the control of Donald Trump and could be used without the UK having any say at all in the matter. In fact, we wonder whether the UK government has even been notified by the US Air Force that the weapons are now stationed at Lakenheath.

“The nuclear weapons now stored at Lakenheath have an explosive power of up to 50 kilotons. For comparison, the atom bomb that devastated Hiroshima in 1945 had an explosive yield of 15 kilotons. Far from protecting Europeans during wartime, these nuclear weapons would contribute to turning Europe into a radioactive wasteland.

“Despite the significant issues and risks involved in basing these weapons of mass destruction in Europe, neither the US nor the UK government have bothered to inform citizens or Parliament that they have been deployed here. Nukewatch UK believes that UK citizens have a right to know that these preparations for fighting a nuclear war are under way, and we will continue to report on nuclear movements to Lakenheath and other European nuclear bases”.

Photographs

Please note: photos were taken from a vantage point outside Lakenheath air base and some distance from the unloading pad, and so images are of limited quality.  Unless otherwise stated, images are credited to Nukewatch UK and may only be reproduced for not-for-profit purposes.

1.  US Air Force security vehicles on patrol at Lakenheath before the flight arrives.  The red X indicates a US security vehicle near the perimeter fence.

2.  Flight Reach 4574 arrives at Lakenheath.

3.  The aircraft taxis towards the Victor Ramp area where hazardous cargo is handled.

3.  Taxiing towards the Victor Ramp area.

4.  Moving into position on Victor Ramp.

5. Circling on Victor Ramp.

6. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp.

7. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp.  The red X indicates a fire tender on station in the event of any emergencies.

8.  Location of the aircraft in relation to the rest of Lakenheath air base.

9. Chart of Lakenheath air base showing the location of Victor Ramp.  The chart is oriented along the axis of the Lakenheath runway.  Credit: US Air Force.

10.  Flight path taken by Flight 4574 across the UK on 17 July.  Credit: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.

 

11.  Sound clip of the dispatcher at Kirtland Air Force Base reading the flight departure clearance for Flight 4574, and stumbling as if surprised over the destination “echo golf uniform lima” (EGUL is the ICAO aircraft code for Lakenheath).

12.  Sound clip of the pilot of Flight 4574 announcing to the ground controller at Kirtland Air Force Base that the aircraft is moving from Pad 5 to take off with “haz cargo”.

Timeline to touchdown

(All times shown are British Summer Time)

26 October 2022:

‘Politico’ magazine reports that B61-12 nuclear weapon will be rolled out for deployment in Europe from December 2022.

18 December 2024:

B61-12 manufacturing programme complete.

10-11 June 2025:

Major exercise involving aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing at Lakenheath – a rehearsal for the delivery operation?

Tuesday 15 July 2025:

15.19: Reach 4574 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord

17.38: Reach 4574 arrives at Kirtland Air Force Base

22.08: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord

Wednesday 16 July:

09.00 – 10.00: ‘Quiet hour’ briefing at Lakenheath

09.35: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 arrives at Ramstein Air Base after brief stop at Lakenheath

Thursday 17 July:

02.34: Reach 4574 leaves Kirtland Air Force Base

06.16: In-flight refuelling off the east coast of the USA

12.50: Reach 4547 arrives at Lakenheath

13.00: Aircraft in position on Victor ramp

14.15 Unloading commences.

Friday 18 July

16.22: Reach 4574 leaves Lakenheath

01.48: Reach 4574 arrives at Joint Base Lewis-McChord: mission complete.

 

Nuclear weapons at Lakenheath – the evidence

Hazardous cargo: Flight Reach 4574 was a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force mission and according to the pilot, it was transporting hazardous cargo.

High security operation: During the arrival and unloading of Reach 4574 Lakenheath air base was at a heightened level of security, with frequent security and police patrols inside the perimeter wire and US Air Force Office of Special Investigations personnel on duty outside.

No fly zone: No flights were permitted to or from Lakenheath air base while Reach 4574 was on the ground, and flying was not permitted within a radius of 2.5 nautical miles of the base.

Aircraft unloading: Cargo was unloaded from Reach 4574 with great care and was transported carefully away from the aircraft at slow speed.

Rehearsal exercise: A two day exercise involving a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force aircraft took place at Lakenheath five weeks before Reach 4574 arrived – a final rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation?

Quiet hour: A special ‘quiet hour’ briefing for all personnel took place at Lakenheath the day before Reach 4574 landed.

Infrastructure upgrade: Concurrent with the deployment of new F-35A aircraft at Lakenheath and the B61-12 nuclear weapon upgrade, nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath has been upgraded.

In the light of this evidence Nukewatch UK considers that B61-12 nuclear weapons were brought to Lakenheath on flight Reach 4574 on 17 July 2025.

Information sources:

ADS-B Exchange

FlightRadar 24

Airplanes.Live

Airframes.io

LiveATC

The increase in warhead numbers announced in the recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy has already commenced and may even be nearing completion, according to an analysis by Nukewatch of nuclear warhead convoy journeys conducted over the last decade.

In March 2021, as part of the Integrated Review, the government announced that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. Nukewatch has prepared a technical note to explain the announcement in the Integrated Review in the light of our monitoring of warhead convoy movements between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and serviced, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot in Coulport in Scotland, whether they are stored.

Our analysis shows that in the first part of the decade (2010 – 2015) there was a slow but steady reduction in numbers of warheads in the UK warhead stockpile held at Coulport. However, from 2015-6 onwards this trend is reversed, and there has been a net transfer of warheads from AWE to Coulport, resulting in an increase in the stockpile held by the Royal Navy. There has been a marked upturn in the rate of delivery of warheads from AWE to Coulport over the past two years, 2019 and 2020.

Nukewatch believes the initial reduction in warhead numbers can be explained by measures to bring the UK warhead stockpile to below 180, as pledged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review by the then Conservative – Liberal Democrat government. From around 2015/16 AWE commenced delivery of the Mk4A upgrade of the UK Trident warhead to the Royal Navy, and increases in the stockpile observed since 2015-16 represent deliveries of newly manufactured Mk4A warheads. Assuming a 2010 baseline of 225 warheads in the stockpile, on the basis of our assessment Nukewatch estimates that the UK warhead stockpile had grown to around 250 warheads by December 2020.

Read the full details here.

East Lothian, 11th July 2019

Nukewatch has welcomed aspects of a Scottish Government review of the preparedness of the civil authorities in Scotland to respond effectively to an incident involving the transportation by road of UK nuclear warheads, but is still far from reassured.

 

Following the publication of the Nukewatch Report “Unready Scotland” which highlighted the dangers of the traffic and the poor level of awareness and readiness at local authority level, Mark Ruskell MSP initiated a members’ debate in Holyrood in May 2018. At the conclusion of the debate Annabelle Ewing, the then Minister for Community Safety, indicated her intention to ask the Police and Fire and Rescue Services to conduct a preparedness review., after making the point that reassurance was necessary. The report on this review is now available.

For Nukewatch Jane Tallents said:

“We are glad to see that the review exercise has been very broad in its scope, has prompted a good deal of agency awareness of the problem, has already led to the tightening of some procedures and prompted helpful recommendations. We cannot help but note that such a review would not have happened without persistent pressure over the years from Nukewatch and the support of individual parliamentarians.

There are however a number of critical flaws in the review. The agencies concerned have been all too ready to accept without due diligence statements from the UK Ministry of Defence, without engaging with other recognised expertise, as we had recommended. This is especially true on the question of risk assessment. The MoD’s single factor risk assessment – that the likelihood of an incident is remote is accepted without any mention of the second factor in any standard risk assessment, the potential severity of consequence. The review also fails to register adequately the unique hazards posed by the transport, and relies too heavily on generic emergency responses.

There is also no mention of the increase in public concern about the convoys. For those living near Faslane/Coulport there is the Clyde Emergency plan which at least gives basic information to the public about how to act in case of an incident. Also, fixed nuclear sites are governed by the REPPIR regulations. Astonishingly, the review does not deal with the fact that no such such framework exists for the convoys. Members of the public who are aware of the convoys need practical information about what to do in the case of an actual accident to keep them and their families safe. This review does not give this information or indicate where it might be found or accessed.

It is most disappointing that Ash Denham, the current Minister, has endorsed the review in her introduction and given the false impression that all is well. The Scottish Government has a prime responsibility for the safety of citizens and must recognise that this case is far from closed.”

A post exercise report from the Director of the MOD convoy accident exercise Astral Climb in 2016 reveals that the scenario used was unrealistic and the whole exercise appeared more about ticking boxes than testing any preparedness to protect the public.

This nuclear transport emergency response  exercise was conducted on Wed 22 June 2016 at the closed Longannet Power Station, Fife in Scotland.

The Directors report was obtained under a Freedom Of Information request submitted 30.3.2017 and  received 24.5.2019 and it states that “The exercise was planned to test and demonstrate the Command and Control activities of the MOD Road Convoy Immediate Response Force (IRF) and to demonstrate their integration with the responding Civilian Emergency Services (CES).”

Exercise Planning was led by Nuclear Emergency Organisation & supported by AWE staff and planning meetings were held with the Scottish Multi Agency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU).

The scenario was that a convoy having been diverted from its usual route (presumably the A1) is on the A199. As it approaches the junction with the A198 the driver of an HGV loses control and emerges from the junction into the path on the oncoming convoy. It collides with the third warhead carrier. 2 private cars and a small van were also involved.

This location is on a side road parallel to and about 50m from the A1 between West Barns and East Linton to the West of Dunbar. To our knowledge the convoy has never been on this road. The prevailing wind would conveniently blow any radioactive release across a few fields and out to sea. There are very few dwellings in the area although any change of wind direction would send a radioactive cloud over East Linton, Dunbar and a number of small villages in the area. The convoy travels through heavy traffic and urban areas on motorways.  Why wasn’t the scenario an accident on the M74 in Glasgow, or the M9 in Stirling or the Edinburgh city bypass so that protecting and warning  large numbers of people could be tested?

Although in the scenario the warhead is “disrupted” and partially explodes causing a release of radiation the Directors report states that “It was accepted by all agencies participating that the energy involved in such a collision would not be sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material and that the scenario was only being used to facilitate play”.

If the purpose of an exercise is to test the response to a nuclear warhead convoy accident then using a scenario that they can claim would not release radiation seems to show more concern for reducing negative publicity than protecting the public.

Even though the scenario being “played” was with a radioactive release there then appears to be no further reference to it apart from some people going on a Radioactive Materials Emergency Response Course in advance and that  “The convoy decontamination was thorough. CES were processed as well as convoy personel”. There is no mention of protection of the public ie no efforts to warn people to shelter and take cover, or evacuate residents from the emergency zone.  It’s not clear what modelling was done as part of the exercise to predict how the radioactive plume would spread.

The report says some responders were wearing just a paper face mask and that contamination levels close to the truck would be too high for this to be effective. However, the next point states that there are problems with communications when personnel have to wear respirators. There is no mention of whether members of the public ie casualties were given any kind of protection.  

Command and control was established within 40 minutes: this seems a bit of a long time given that the convoy control vehicle is more or less on scene from the start.

Scottish Fire and Rescue deployed within 26 minutes – this sounds pretty good but we have no idea how far they had to travel or the extent to which they were pre-notified.

There were the usual problems with communications. The police couldn’t understand the convoy commander due to the respirator. Some previous problems were solved by giving the convoy crew a Scottish fire service radio.

Restrictions on the use of radios was not adequately briefed. This  this could potentially be a serious issue.  Mobile phones are banned in explosives handling areas (eg RAF Welford) as they are a detonation risk.  There is research from the US that when nuclear weapons are fire damaged electric currents can flow through them in all kind of weird ways, so this may potentially be a safety concern if it could trigger the explosive to go off.

The MoD Co-ordinating Authority Executive Team were prepositioned before the exercise.  This is the main source of MoD expertise on site for dealing with an accident.  Given that it took them around 5 hours to get the team up from Bath for Senator 11, prepositioning the team is ‘cheating’ in a big way and raises a very serious question about how realistic the exercise was.

It does not appear that any actual nuclear warhead convoy vehicles were present at the exercise. An HGV and some cars were used losing any sense of a real situation with a 23 vehicle convoy with some uniquely constructed vehicles included.

Although the main objective was demonstrating a satisfactory response and the secondary objective was to provide training, at times it reads more like the exercises was mainly a training activity for Emergency Services  than an assessed challenge.

Conclusion from Nukewatch

The MOD are now conducting nuclear weapons convoy accident exercises which don’t even pretend to test  any measures to protect the public from a radiation release. In the past more realistic exercise scenarios still stopped short of actual evacuation and sheltering of the public but at least played out on paper how that might be done. For Astral Climb 2016 the MOD imagined a convoy on a back road (it never uses) nowhere near any population centres and they involved police and fire officers  without even having  any convoy vehicles present at the exercise.  Nukewatch can only conclude that the MOD itself realise that a robust test of emergency procedures would always show that the public would be put at risk and therefore they have moved to an annual box ticking exercise with the minimum of information being released to the public. 

The Scottish Government which observed this exercise and the Emergency Services that took part should be calling for more transparency about arrangements for protecting the public and speaking out if those are not in place. The scenarios for future exercises should be set by the regulators and civil emergency services to ensure that they are realistic and challenging. Of course the best way to protect the public is to stop transporting nuclear warheads on our roads altogether.

Article in the Ferret

Press release
The Scottish government expects that the review it has commissioned on the readiness of the Scottish civil authorities to respond to an incident involving the transport by road of nuclear warheads will be published early in 2019.

The indication comes in a letter to Nukewatch from the office of Community Safety Minister Ash Denham. In May of this year Denham’s predecessor, Annabelle Ewing, at the close of a parliamentary debate on the issue, promised that a review of the arrangements would be sought from police and fire service inspectorates.

The letter, in response to a query from Nukewatch about the timing of the review, also says:

“It is important to all those engaged in the preparedness review that it is comprehensive in nature, as open and transparent as possible and culminates in a publicly available report, within a reasonable timescale.”

For Nukewatch David Mackenzie said:

“Our 2017 report Unready Scotland ended with the recommendation that SCOTGOV should conduct just such a review and we are pleased at the progress that is being made. Transparency is vital over an issue of such public concern and at a time of growing awareness of the threats to safety posed by the transport of nuclear warheads. Each and every SCOTGOV minister has signed the ICAN parliamentary pledge to work for the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and facing up to the grim realities of the warhead transport is a good step towards compliance with the Treaty’s requirements.”

Report from Members Debate in Holyrood – 2 May 2018. 

Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport. 

Yesterday for over an hour the Scottish Parliament discussed nuclear weapons convoys in a debate raised by Mark Ruskell MSP from the Scottish Greens. It was a member’s debate which comes after decision time so most members leave then but 22 stayed to listen and contribute.

Mark Ruskell introduced the motion and thanked David Mackenzie and Jane Tallents for the Unready Scotland report and paid tribute to the work of the Nukewatch network. He explained why the hazards of nuclear weapons transport are so unique and how the results of a survey of Scottish Local Authorities by him which showed that none of them had conducted risk assessments or informed the public.  He said that the current devolution settlement laid responsibility for community safety with the Scottish Government under the Civil Contingencies Act 2014 and called for them to hold a review of civil authorities plans for a convoy accident.

Bill Kidd (SNP) said no one should be ignorant of what these convoys carry and called for the minister to consider setting up a group to conduct a review.

Edward Mountain, Conservative, set out a number of facts as he saw them.  Basically be believes that the warheads are safe to transport, security is high, contingency plans are in place and all civil authorities are consulted before a convoy begins its journey.

Claudia Beamish from Labour said she was concerned about the failure of local authorities to ensure compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and she called on the Minister to highlight how civilian partnerships were interlinked and she called for a review.

Clare Haughey (SNP), Gordon MacDonald (SNP), Bruce Crawford (SNP) and Tom Arthur (SNP)  all spoke about concerns about convoys through or near to their constituencies, made lots of good points and called for action from the Minister.

Maurice Cory (Con) said that the public has nothing to fear and in an incident the convoy commander would take charge. He did however commend to the Minister that she look at the exercises around Faslane as an example of informing the public and progress that elsewhere.

Ross Greer (Green) said that a warhead in transit equates to the most powerful and dangerous dirty bomb imaginable and that all public bodies that are Category One Responders should be prepared. He hoped that the debate would prompt councils to live up to their responsibilities.

 At the end Annabelle Ewing, Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, replied for the government.

She said that the three resilience partnerships regularly undertake a risk and preparedness assessment process which enables them to identify and assess the main risks that are relevant to their regions and determine how prepared they are to deal with the consequences of those risks. In response to an intervention from Mark Ruskell she said that those specifically include assessment and planning regarding nuclear convoys.

However she said she would write to HM Inspectorate of the Constabulary and HM Fire Service Inspectorate in Scotland to request a joint review of the resilience work of Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to look at “how they work with local authorities and the other responders in Scotland’s regional resilience partnerships to ensure that response arrangements are indeed up to date and current, because we all want to have that assurance.”

The full transcript is available at http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=11499

Unready Scotland Report available here

Nukewatch comment. We are very pleased that the Scottish Parliament spent an hour discussing our concerns about the risks of nuclear weapons convoys on our roads and the lack of public information about any emergency plans to deal with a serious incident. It is encouraging to see how many MSPs are well informed and truly represent their constituents by calling for a review of the arrangements that would be in place should the worst happen. The Ministers request that Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service conduct a review is progress and may ultimately lead to greater awareness of nuclear weapons transport and the risks involved.

There are still many questions and much work to do. 

Press articles:

Scotsman

Common Space

The motion “Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport” lodged by Mark Ruskell MSP will be debated in Holyrood next Wednesday, May 2nd at 5pm. See full text below.

Although as a Members Debate it won’t result in a vote Mark will speak about the Nukewatch report UNREADY SCOTLAND and our request to the Scottish Government to conduct an open review of civil authorities readiness to respond to a serious accident with a nuclear weapon in transit.

The report arose from a survey that Mark Ruskell’s office conducted of local authorities that convoys pass through. The results showed the woeful lack of emergency planning for an accident with such a unique cargo – high explosives combined with radioactive material including plutonium. They seemed content to leave public safety in the hands of the MOD although it’s clear that the MOD would expect first responders including councils to take care of the public including evacuations and disseminating advice to take shelter.

We have already sent the report to all MSPs on convoy routes but to have this information formally put on record in the Holyrood chamber is important. The Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy, Paul Wheelhouse MSP will respond at the end of the debate.

If you live in Scotland please can you ask your MSPs to sign the motion and attend the debate. You can see if the convoys travel through your area by looking at the Council areas mentioned in the motion. Support from any MSP’s is helpful but it would be especially valuable if those whose constituents are put at risk by the transport of nuclear weapons could go to the debate and contribute. Hearing from you would encourage that.

It would be great to see a good attendance in the public gallery. You can book a ticket online 

Or let us know you want to attend and we can meet you in the main lobby at 4.30pm with tickets.

Mark Ruskell is booking a room where we can discuss what was said afterwards and have some refreshments. Please let us know if you want to join us.

Find out more about  UNREADY SCOTLAND and read the full report  here. 

Jane Tallents and David Mackenzie for Nukewatch.

 

Motion S5M-11539: Mark Ruskell, Mid Scotland and Fife, Scottish Green Party, Date Lodged: 09/04/2018

Civil Contingency in Nuclear Weapon Transport

That the Parliament understands that the Ministry of Defence regularly transports nuclear weapons on public roads in convoys that pass through or close to communities in the Argyll and Bute, Dumfries and Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, East Lothian, Edinburgh, Falkirk, Glasgow, Midlothian, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, Stirling, South Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and West Lothian local authority areas; believes that there is an inherent risk in transporting high explosives and radioactive material together on public roads; understands that information on what to do in an emergency involving a nuclear reactor is regularly circulated to residents close to the Coulport and Faslane bases but that no equivalent information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route; believes that although defence is a reserved matter, it would be for the civil authorities such as police, fire and rescue and local authorities to attempt to respond to any emergency as so-called category 1 responders, and notes the view that these civil authorities must have sufficient assessments and plans in place to respond.

Check here so see if your MSPs have signed it.