Watching Britain's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nukewatch monitor and track the movement of British WMD’s from Aldermaston in Berkshire to Coulport on the West coast of Scotland.
Nukewatch is not a membership organisation. It is a network of individuals who campaign against nuclear warhead convoys, mainly because they are part of a system of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but also because we believe that communities potentially affected by the convoys should be aware of their existence and the risks they pose.
The increase in warhead numbers announced in the recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy has already commenced and may even be nearing completion, according to an analysis by Nukewatch of nuclear warhead convoy journeys conducted over the last decade.
In March 2021, as part of the Integrated Review, the government announced that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. Nukewatch has prepared a technical note to explain the announcement in the Integrated Review in the light of our monitoring of warhead convoy movements between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and serviced, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot in Coulport in Scotland, whether they are stored.
Our analysis shows that in the first part of the decade (2010 – 2015) there was a slow but steady reduction in numbers of warheads in the UK warhead stockpile held at Coulport. However, from 2015-6 onwards this trend is reversed, and there has been a net transfer of warheads from AWE to Coulport, resulting in an increase in the stockpile held by the Royal Navy. There has been a marked upturn in the rate of delivery of warheads from AWE to Coulport over the past two years, 2019 and 2020.
Nukewatch believes the initial reduction in warhead numbers can be explained by measures to bring the UK warhead stockpile to below 180, as pledged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review by the then Conservative – Liberal Democrat government. From around 2015/16 AWE commenced delivery of the Mk4A upgrade of the UK Trident warhead to the Royal Navy, and increases in the stockpile observed since 2015-16 represent deliveries of newly manufactured Mk4A warheads. Assuming a 2010 baseline of 225 warheads in the stockpile, on the basis of our assessment Nukewatch estimates that the UK warhead stockpile had grown to around 250 warheads by December 2020.
Read the full details here.
Nukewatch has welcomed aspects of a Scottish Government review of the preparedness of the civil authorities in Scotland to respond effectively to an incident involving the transportation by road of UK nuclear warheads, but is still far from reassured.
Following the publication of the Nukewatch Report “Unready Scotland” which highlighted the dangers of the traffic and the poor level of awareness and readiness at local authority level, Mark Ruskell MSP initiated a members’ debate in Holyrood in May 2018. At the conclusion of the debate Annabelle Ewing, the then Minister for Community Safety, indicated her intention to ask the Police and Fire and Rescue Services to conduct a preparedness review., after making the point that reassurance was necessary. The report on this review is now available.
For Nukewatch Jane Tallents said:
“We are glad to see that the review exercise has been very broad in its scope, has prompted a good deal of agency awareness of the problem, has already led to the tightening of some procedures and prompted helpful recommendations. We cannot help but note that such a review would not have happened without persistent pressure over the years from Nukewatch and the support of individual parliamentarians.
There are however a number of critical flaws in the review. The agencies concerned have been all too ready to accept without due diligence statements from the UK Ministry of Defence, without engaging with other recognised expertise, as we had recommended. This is especially true on the question of risk assessment. The MoD’s single factor risk assessment – that the likelihood of an incident is remote is accepted without any mention of the second factor in any standard risk assessment, the potential severity of consequence. The review also fails to register adequately the unique hazards posed by the transport, and relies too heavily on generic emergency responses.
There is also no mention of the increase in public concern about the convoys. For those living near Faslane/Coulport there is the Clyde Emergency plan which at least gives basic information to the public about how to act in case of an incident. Also, fixed nuclear sites are governed by the REPPIR regulations. Astonishingly, the review does not deal with the fact that no such such framework exists for the convoys. Members of the public who are aware of the convoys need practical information about what to do in the case of an actual accident to keep them and their families safe. This review does not give this information or indicate where it might be found or accessed.
It is most disappointing that Ash Denham, the current Minister, has endorsed the review in her introduction and given the false impression that all is well. The Scottish Government has a prime responsibility for the safety of citizens and must recognise that this case is far from closed.”
A post exercise report from the Director of the MOD convoy accident exercise Astral Climb in 2016 reveals that the scenario used was unrealistic and the whole exercise appeared more about ticking boxes than testing any preparedness to protect the public.
This nuclear transport emergency response exercise was conducted on Wed 22 June 2016 at the closed Longannet Power Station, Fife in Scotland.
The Directors report was obtained under a Freedom Of Information request submitted 30.3.2017 and received 24.5.2019 and it states that “The exercise was planned to test and demonstrate the Command and Control activities of the MOD Road Convoy Immediate Response Force (IRF) and to demonstrate their integration with the responding Civilian Emergency Services (CES).”
Exercise Planning was led by Nuclear Emergency Organisation & supported by AWE staff and planning meetings were held with the Scottish Multi Agency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU).
The scenario was that a convoy having been diverted from its usual route (presumably the A1) is on the A199. As it approaches the junction with the A198 the driver of an HGV loses control and emerges from the junction into the path on the oncoming convoy. It collides with the third warhead carrier. 2 private cars and a small van were also involved.
This location is on a side road parallel to and about 50m from the A1 between West Barns and East Linton to the West of Dunbar. To our knowledge the convoy has never been on this road. The prevailing wind would conveniently blow any radioactive release across a few fields and out to sea. There are very few dwellings in the area although any change of wind direction would send a radioactive cloud over East Linton, Dunbar and a number of small villages in the area. The convoy travels through heavy traffic and urban areas on motorways. Why wasn’t the scenario an accident on the M74 in Glasgow, or the M9 in Stirling or the Edinburgh city bypass so that protecting and warning large numbers of people could be tested?
Although in the scenario the warhead is “disrupted” and partially explodes causing a release of radiation the Directors report states that “It was accepted by all agencies participating that the energy involved in such a collision would not be sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material and that the scenario was only being used to facilitate play”.
If the purpose of an exercise is to test the response to a nuclear warhead convoy accident then using a scenario that they can claim would not release radiation seems to show more concern for reducing negative publicity than protecting the public.
Even though the scenario being “played” was with a radioactive release there then appears to be no further reference to it apart from some people going on a Radioactive Materials Emergency Response Course in advance and that “The convoy decontamination was thorough. CES were processed as well as convoy personel”. There is no mention of protection of the public ie no efforts to warn people to shelter and take cover, or evacuate residents from the emergency zone. It’s not clear what modelling was done as part of the exercise to predict how the radioactive plume would spread.
The report says some responders were wearing just a paper face mask and that contamination levels close to the truck would be too high for this to be effective. However, the next point states that there are problems with communications when personnel have to wear respirators. There is no mention of whether members of the public ie casualties were given any kind of protection.
Command and control was established within 40 minutes: this seems a bit of a long time given that the convoy control vehicle is more or less on scene from the start.
Scottish Fire and Rescue deployed within 26 minutes – this sounds pretty good but we have no idea how far they had to travel or the extent to which they were pre-notified.
There were the usual problems with communications. The police couldn’t understand the convoy commander due to the respirator. Some previous problems were solved by giving the convoy crew a Scottish fire service radio.
Restrictions on the use of radios was not adequately briefed. This this could potentially be a serious issue. Mobile phones are banned in explosives handling areas (eg RAF Welford) as they are a detonation risk. There is research from the US that when nuclear weapons are fire damaged electric currents can flow through them in all kind of weird ways, so this may potentially be a safety concern if it could trigger the explosive to go off.
The MoD Co-ordinating Authority Executive Team were prepositioned before the exercise. This is the main source of MoD expertise on site for dealing with an accident. Given that it took them around 5 hours to get the team up from Bath for Senator 11, prepositioning the team is ‘cheating’ in a big way and raises a very serious question about how realistic the exercise was.
It does not appear that any actual nuclear warhead convoy vehicles were present at the exercise. An HGV and some cars were used losing any sense of a real situation with a 23 vehicle convoy with some uniquely constructed vehicles included.
Although the main objective was demonstrating a satisfactory response and the secondary objective was to provide training, at times it reads more like the exercises was mainly a training activity for Emergency Services than an assessed challenge.
Conclusion from Nukewatch
The MOD are now conducting nuclear weapons convoy accident exercises which don’t even pretend to test any measures to protect the public from a radiation release. In the past more realistic exercise scenarios still stopped short of actual evacuation and sheltering of the public but at least played out on paper how that might be done. For Astral Climb 2016 the MOD imagined a convoy on a back road (it never uses) nowhere near any population centres and they involved police and fire officers without even having any convoy vehicles present at the exercise. Nukewatch can only conclude that the MOD itself realise that a robust test of emergency procedures would always show that the public would be put at risk and therefore they have moved to an annual box ticking exercise with the minimum of information being released to the public.
The Scottish Government which observed this exercise and the Emergency Services that took part should be calling for more transparency about arrangements for protecting the public and speaking out if those are not in place. The scenarios for future exercises should be set by the regulators and civil emergency services to ensure that they are realistic and challenging. Of course the best way to protect the public is to stop transporting nuclear warheads on our roads altogether.
The convoy that had been in Burghfield since Thurs May 9th left on the morning of Wed May 15th. It headed east on the M4, around the M25 and then north on the A1. After a break at RAF Wittering it continued up the A1 and into RAF Leeming late afternoon.
It was spotted the following morning, Wed May 16th, at Scotch corner heading north on the A1 but then took the A69 across country to Carlisle. Taking its usual route up the M74, M73, M80, M9 and A811 it arrived at Coulport in early evening. You can see a film of the full convoy here.
Leaving Coulport on May 21st unusually late at lunchtime it headed back via Stirling and down the M74 and was spotted on the M6 near Penrith in the evening.
It returned to Burghfield late evening/overnight May 22/23
A nuclear weapons convoy set off from AWE Burghfield on the morning of Tues March 19th and headed west on the M4 and then north on the A34. It pulled off onto the slip road at Didcot where the warhead carriers and their security escort were parked for 15 minutes. Other support vehicles went to the nearby services. See a report about it in the Oxford Mail
It then continued on the A34, M40 and A43 to join the M1 north. It was later spotted on the A1 near Aberford.
The following day March 20th the convoy was picked up in Scotland on the M74 at Abington in mid afternoon. It then went north on the M73, M80 and M9 to Stirling then via the A811 to RNAD Coulport.
These vehicles left again on March 26th but individually and not in full convoy formation.
Two new vehicles were spotted in this convoy:
OSU van – white with blue/yellow checkers on side, no side windows, Iveco make, seen in front of the main convoy.
Green / khaki large coach – seen in rear support convoy near usual silver / mauve coach. The usual Renault big workshop van with decontamination trailer was not seen so presumed to have been replaced by the new coach.
A convoy with four warhead carriers left AWE Burghfield on the morning of Saturday January 12th. After joining the M4 it headed east, went round the M25 and then north on the A1 until it stopped for a break at RAF Wittering. From there it continued north on the A1 again to spend a night at RAF Leeming. The following day, Sunday 13th it was spotted on the M74 near Hamilton early afternoon. Heading up the M73 and M80 to the M9 it took a break at DSG Forthside in Stirling. It then had to loop back south to re-join the M9 and then go north to turn off west on the A811. From Balloch it travelled up the side of Loch Lomond to arrive at RNAD Coulport late afternoon.
On Thursday January 17th the convoy set out for the return journey. 4 warhead carriers left mid morning and returned by the A811, M9, M80, M73 and M74 passing Hamilton mid afternoon. The following day January 18th it was seen on the A1 at Wentbridge and Doncaster. After going onto the M1 it turned off on the M69 to take a break at Gamecock Barracks. From there it went on to M6 then back on to M1, leaving at the A43 Northampton junction. From there it went via the A43, M40 and A34, hitting the Northern Oxford ring road (Kidlington) during the rush hour and then south to the M4 and back into Burghfield.
A video of the convoy leaving its break in Stirling on the way up (Sunday 13th Jan) filmed by Mark Ruskell, Nukewatcher and Member of the Scottish Parliament was posted on his Facebook face has been shared thousands of times and been seen by 185,000 people in a week.
Press release
The Scottish government expects that the review it has commissioned on the readiness of the Scottish civil authorities to respond to an incident involving the transport by road of nuclear warheads will be published early in 2019.
The indication comes in a letter to Nukewatch from the office of Community Safety Minister Ash Denham. In May of this year Denham’s predecessor, Annabelle Ewing, at the close of a parliamentary debate on the issue, promised that a review of the arrangements would be sought from police and fire service inspectorates.
The letter, in response to a query from Nukewatch about the timing of the review, also says:
“It is important to all those engaged in the preparedness review that it is comprehensive in nature, as open and transparent as possible and culminates in a publicly available report, within a reasonable timescale.”
For Nukewatch David Mackenzie said:
“Our 2017 report Unready Scotland ended with the recommendation that SCOTGOV should conduct just such a review and we are pleased at the progress that is being made. Transparency is vital over an issue of such public concern and at a time of growing awareness of the threats to safety posed by the transport of nuclear warheads. Each and every SCOTGOV minister has signed the ICAN parliamentary pledge to work for the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and facing up to the grim realities of the warhead transport is a good step towards compliance with the Treaty’s requirements.”
