Watching Britain's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nukewatch monitor and track the movement of British WMD’s from Aldermaston in Berkshire to Coulport on the West coast of Scotland.
Nukewatch is not a membership organisation. It is a network of individuals who campaign against nuclear warhead convoys, mainly because they are part of a system of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but also because we believe that communities potentially affected by the convoys should be aware of their existence and the risks they pose.
Armed Ministry of Defence police on patrol outside Lakenheath air base on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Following a delivery of nuclear weapons to Lakenheath US air base in Suffolk on 17-18 July 2025, a second Prime Nuclear Airlift force flew to Lakenheath on 24-25 July to delivery a high priority hazardous cargo.
The mission in many ways replicated the previous week’s delivery, with the same aircraft used to delivery the cargo to Lakenheath; a similar schedule; and another spare aircraft on standby at Ramstein US base in Germany. During the primary mission a C-17 aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing flew to Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, where it loaded a cargo on Pad 5 – the section of the airbase designated for handing hazardous cargoes. The aircraft then flew on to Lakenheath to deliver its cargo, remaining there overnight before returning directly to its home base at McChord Air Force Base in Washington state. Please see below for flight details.
Nukewatch was again able to observe the delivery and unloading at Lakenheath on 24 July, although as a result of poor weather and visibility our deductions are qualified. On this occasion, unlike the previous delivery to Lakenheath, armed Ministry of Defence police were on patrol around the outside of the base. The aircraft again unloaded on the Victor Ramp hazardous cargo area. Static security vehicle pickets were located inside the base fence, but in fewer numbers when compared with the previous week, and not in a pronounced semi-circle around the aircraft as before.
US Air Force C-17 aircraft 08-8200 taxiing towards Victor Ramp at Lakenheath air base on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
The aircraft unloading procedure took around two hours, following a period of around one hour after the aircraft landed while it taxied to the ramp and personnel and vehicles assembled before unloading began in earnest. Unloading operations appeared to follow a different format to the previous week. Loads appeared to have been transferred from the aircraft by four to six small convoys consisting of two or three larger vehicles (different to those observed last week) accompanied by a smaller vehicle. A separate vehicle / vehicles regularly shuttled between the aircraft and unloading vehicles throughout the unloading operation.
On the second day (Friday 25 July) security arrangements at the base and around the aircraft were noticeably more relaxed. Activities continued around the aircraft, including possibly some unloading or loading, and also refuelling before the aircraft departed early in the afternoon.
Nukewatch concludes the following:
A high security unloading operation for hazardous materials took place at Lakenheath.
The operation seemed to follow slightly different procedures to the one observed the previous week.
Nevertheless, the degree of security and general circumstances of the flight seem to indicate that a nuclear-related load was probably delivered in the aircraft. This may have been components and equipment related to nuclear weapons, or possibly weapons themselves.
Between four to six loads seemed to be transported away from the aircraft in small convoys to a location on the airbase nearby.
Assuming two or three transporting vehicles in each convoy, and each convoy carried one nuclear bomb, this suggests that between around 8 and 18 ‘units’ of cargo were delivered by this flight.
(all times British Summer Time)
Main aircraft: C-17 08-8200, flight number RCH4574
Tuesday 22 July:
15.45: Departure from McChord Air Force Base.
18:14: Arrival at Kirtland Air Force Base and cargo loading.
Wednesday 23 July:
23:48: Departure from Kirtland Air Force Base followed by refuelling over West Atlantic.
Thursday 24 July:
10:08: Arrival at Lakenheath Air Base and cargo unloading.
Friday 25 July:
13:39: Departure from Lakenheath Air Base.
23:54: Arrival at McChord Air Force Base.
Standby aircraft: C-17 09-9211, flight number RCH4134
22 July 2025:
22.03: Departure from McChord Air Force Base.
23 July 2024:
08:03: Arrival at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
24 July 2025:
15:45: Departure from Ramstein Air Base.
25 July 2025:
02:23: Arrival at McChord AFB.
Flight path of C-17 08-8200 across the UK on Thursday 24 July. Image: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.
Personnel and vehicles mustering around the aircraft before unloading on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Vehicles unloading aircraft on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Security vehicle on patrol at Lakenheath air base, 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
US nuclear bombs were delivered to Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July as part of NATO plans to deploy new battlefield nuclear nuclear weapons intended for war-fighting in Europe.
A United States Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft prepares to unload nuclear weapons at Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July. Credit: Nukewatch UK
The arrival of a special flight transporting the bombs was observed by Nukewatch UK, who judge that the evidence publicly available from our observations and flight-tracking data now supports the conclusion that nuclear weapons are based at the Lakenheath US air base in Suffolk. This article explains how the weapons were brought to Lakenheath by the US Air Force and sets out the evidence which indicates they are now stationed at the British base.
Shortly after 7 am local time on Tuesday 15 July a giant C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, flight number RCH4574 (‘Reach 4574’), assigned to the US Air Force’s 62nd Airlift Wing left Joint Base Lewis–McChord, its home base in Washington state. The 62nd Airlift Wing is an elite, highly trained transport unit which serves as the US Air Force’s Prime Nuclear Airlift Force: the only Air Force section tasked with the role of supporting the US Department of Defence and Department of Energy with their nuclear airlift operations. The aircraft undertaking the flight was a C-17 with the serial number 08-8200, flying on high priority mission with the air force mission number PAM112271196.
The aircraft flew across the continental United States to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico – the hub of the US Air Force’s nuclear operations, where the largest nuclear weapons storage facility in the world is located: the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). KUMMSC stores a significant portion of the US nuclear arsenal, including gravity bombs and warheads.
At Kirtland the aircraft almost certainly loaded up with a cargo of anything up to 20 newly manufactured B61-12 nuclear weapons – a new, modernised version of the US Air Force’s principal nuclear gravity bomb with greater accuracy than older variants of the weapon. Manufacturing of the B61-12 variant was completed in December 2024 and the weapon is currently being rolled out on deployment. Whilst at Kirtland the aircraft was parked on Pad 5 – the section of the airbase designated for handling hazardous cargoes. Other aircraft at the airport were given a warning not to overfly the aircraft on Pad 5 for a period of over five hours, which ended only once the C-17 had departed.
Mid evening local time on Wednesday 16 July Reach 4574 took off, with the pilot reminding the ground controller that the aircraft has “haz cargo” on board. The aircraft flew through the night across the Atlantic Ocean, rendezvousing with two KC-46 tanker aircraft from Pease Air National Guard Base and McGuire Air Force Base to refuel over the ocean east of New York.
In a co-ordinated operation, a second C-17 aircraft (aircraft number 09-9211, flight number RCH4205, mission number PAM112472196) also left Lewis-McChord on 15 July and flew to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany (stopping briefly at Lakenheath) to be on standby in the event of a failure or emergency involving the primary aircraft. This standby aircraft may have been loaded with nuclear emergency response equipment for dealing with an accident involving the primary aircraft.
Reach 4574 approached the UK flying south of Ireland, then flew up the Bristol Channel, cut across north Devon, and flew north west along a corridor taking it close to Oxford and Milton Keynes, but avoiding overflying major centres of population. The plane landed at Lakenheath air base at 12.50 local time.
Nukewatch UK was able to observe the aircraft landing and unloading from outside the Lakenheath base. During the unloading operation base security was at an unusually high level, with USAF security patrols and police cars undertaking patrols inside the base’s security fence and plain-clothed (but badged) personnel from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations patrolling outside the base.
After landing the aircraft taxied to an area of the airbase known as ‘Victor Ramp’ – a location towards the centre of the base which is one of the areas designated for loading and unloading hazardous cargoes. During the entire unloading operation the aircraft was accompanied by a US Air Force fire tender, stationed alongside the right wing of the aircraft, and the tender also did a sweep along the runway before the aircraft landed. Security vehicles surrounded the unloading area and a number of vehicles approached the aircraft for the unloading operation, deploying close to its rear drop-down ramp. Following unloading a convoy of several vehicles moved very slowly with red lights flashing to a protected aircraft shelter near the unloading area and disappeared from sight behind the shelter. Among the vehicles seen unloading the aircraft were MHU83 Aircraft Aerial Munitions Lift Trucks, used by the US Air Force for loading and unloading munitions from aircraft, and certified for use with nuclear weapons.
Whilst Reach 4574 was at Lakenheath no other flights flew from the base and a strict ‘no fly’ restriction was in place for a 2.5 nautical mile radius around the base in the Lakenheath Aerodrome Traffic Zone area. The aircraft departed from Lakenheath at the end of the afternoon on Friday 18 July and flew straight back to Lewis-McChord.
Photos of flight Reach 4574 landing at Lakenheath and unloading its cargo accompany this article (please see below). Nukewatch UK believes that this C-17 aircraft was transporting a batch of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion are given below.
Lakenheath air base is no stranger to nuclear weapons, and hosts F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning aircraft, both of which are certified to carry B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. During much of the Cold War nuclear weapons were stored at Lakenheath but in 2008 they were quietly removed from the base following consolidation of the US nuclear arsenal in Europe. Since 2022 nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath, including hardened aircraft shelters and a ‘surety dormitory’, has been upgraded, giving rise to speculation that nuclear weapons would be returning to Suffolk.
The 62nd Airlift Wing regularly conducts Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions across the Atlantic to transport materials and equipment to air bases in Europe which support NATO’s nuclear mission in Europe, under which B61 bombs are stored at US bases in Europe and bases of European nations which take part in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements with the US. Nukewatch has been actively tracking these flights for three years, and has used archived tracking data to analyse flights since the beginning of 2020. Over this period missions have included occasional operations which have been unusually complex, involving up to seven aircraft as stand-bys and for in-flight refuelling. In addition to operations involving nuclear weapons, the unit also conducts missions transporting special nuclear materials which visit several NATO nuclear bases in Europe in sequence, and also conducts missions involving training with ground personnel at several nuclear bases.
It is possible that the earliest of these missions were training and rehearsal flights for the delivery of new B61-12 nuclear bombs to Europe, with more recent flights actually transporting the nuclear bombs across the Atlantic for deployment at bases in Europe. Nukewatch has observed that Lakenheath has been involved in many of these missions, initially as a location for basing a stand-by aircraft in Europe – possibly for use by a nuclear emergency response team. More recently Lakenheath appears to have been involved in a series of ‘work up’ exercises and security drills involving aircraft from 62 Airlift Wing to prepare the base for the arrival of nuclear weapons, culminating in a large-scale exercise over two days on 10 – 11 June 2025 which may have been a dress rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation. This chart gives an indication of the frequency of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions to Europe since 2020:
Schematic schedule of US Air Force Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to NATO nuclear bases in Europe since 2020.
B61s: Transport of B61 nuclear weapons.
SNM: Special Nuclear Materials (Tritium)
T&E: Training and evaluation
Source: Observations and deductions by Nukewatch UK.
The day before flight Reach 4574 landed Lakenheath air base held a ‘quiet hour’ from 09.00 – 10.00 am – a session where all base personnel are briefed by senior officers on important matters. It is likely that the briefing took place to inform staff at the base that Lakenheath had been formally ‘stood up’ for its nuclear role and to explain arrangements for the delivery operation the next day.
It can be expected that Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to Lakenheath and other European nuclear weapons bases will continue on a regular basis for the foreseeable future. These flights are necessary to deliver materials required for the B61-12 nuclear programme (for example tritium, a radioactive gas involved in boosting a nuclear explosion which has a relatively short half-life and needs regular replenishment); to transport loads to and from the US for servicing and maintenance; and for emergency, security, and crew training exercises.
It is important to understand that the delivery of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath has nothing to do with the recent announcement by the Prime Minister that the UK will purchase a small number of F-35A nuclear-capable aircraft for the Royal Air Force. The UK has not yet purchased these aircraft and a long period of training and certification would be mandated by the US authorities before the RAF was deemed competent to take part in NATO’s tactical nuclear mission. As yet doctrine and operational arrangements for any RAF nuclear role do not appear to have been developed.
Speaking on the delivery of US B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath, Juliet McBride of Nukewatch UK said:
“The new nuclear bombs which are now based at Lakenheath are entirely under the control of Donald Trump and could be used without the UK having any say at all in the matter. In fact, we wonder whether the UK government has even been notified by the US Air Force that the weapons are now stationed at Lakenheath.
“The nuclear weapons now stored at Lakenheath have an explosive power of up to 50 kilotons. For comparison, the atom bomb that devastated Hiroshima in 1945 had an explosive yield of 15 kilotons. Far from protecting Europeans during wartime, these nuclear weapons would contribute to turning Europe into a radioactive wasteland.
“Despite the significant issues and risks involved in basing these weapons of mass destruction in Europe, neither the US nor the UK government have bothered to inform citizens or Parliament that they have been deployed here. Nukewatch UK believes that UK citizens have a right to know that these preparations for fighting a nuclear war are under way, and we will continue to report on nuclear movements to Lakenheath and other European nuclear bases”.
Please note: photos were taken from a vantage point outside Lakenheath air base and some distance from the unloading pad, and so images are of limited quality. Unless otherwise stated, images are credited to Nukewatch UK and may only be reproduced for not-for-profit purposes.
1. US Air Force security vehicles on patrol at Lakenheath before the flight arrives. The red X indicates a US security vehicle near the perimeter fence.
2. Flight Reach 4574 arrives at Lakenheath.
3. The aircraft taxis towards the Victor Ramp area where hazardous cargo is handled.
3. Taxiing towards the Victor Ramp area.
4. Moving into position on Victor Ramp.
5. Circling on Victor Ramp.
6. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp.
7. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp. The red X indicates a fire tender on station in the event of any emergencies.
8. Location of the aircraft in relation to the rest of Lakenheath air base.
9. Chart of Lakenheath air base showing the location of Victor Ramp. The chart is oriented along the axis of the Lakenheath runway. Credit: US Air Force.
10. Flight path taken by Flight 4574 across the UK on 17 July. Credit: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.
11. Sound clip of the dispatcher at Kirtland Air Force Base reading the flight departure clearance for Flight 4574, and stumbling as if surprised over the destination “echo golf uniform lima” (EGUL is the ICAO aircraft code for Lakenheath).
12. Sound clip of the pilot of Flight 4574 announcing to the ground controller at Kirtland Air Force Base that the aircraft is moving from Pad 5 to take off with “haz cargo”.
(All times shown are British Summer Time)
26 October 2022:
‘Politico’ magazine reports that B61-12 nuclear weapon will be rolled out for deployment in Europe from December 2022.
18 December 2024:
B61-12 manufacturing programme complete.
10-11 June 2025:
Major exercise involving aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing at Lakenheath – a rehearsal for the delivery operation?
Tuesday 15 July 2025:
15.19: Reach 4574 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord
17.38: Reach 4574 arrives at Kirtland Air Force Base
22.08: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord
Wednesday 16 July:
09.00 – 10.00: ‘Quiet hour’ briefing at Lakenheath
09.35: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 arrives at Ramstein Air Base after brief stop at Lakenheath
Thursday 17 July:
02.34: Reach 4574 leaves Kirtland Air Force Base
06.16: In-flight refuelling off the east coast of the USA
12.50: Reach 4547 arrives at Lakenheath
13.00: Aircraft in position on Victor ramp
14.15 Unloading commences.
Friday 18 July
16.22: Reach 4574 leaves Lakenheath
01.48: Reach 4574 arrives at Joint Base Lewis-McChord: mission complete.
Hazardous cargo: Flight Reach 4574 was a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force mission and according to the pilot, it was transporting hazardous cargo.
High security operation: During the arrival and unloading of Reach 4574 Lakenheath air base was at a heightened level of security, with frequent security and police patrols inside the perimeter wire and US Air Force Office of Special Investigations personnel on duty outside.
No fly zone: No flights were permitted to or from Lakenheath air base while Reach 4574 was on the ground, and flying was not permitted within a radius of 2.5 nautical miles of the base.
Aircraft unloading: Cargo was unloaded from Reach 4574 with great care and was transported carefully away from the aircraft at slow speed.
Rehearsal exercise: A two day exercise involving a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force aircraft took place at Lakenheath five weeks before Reach 4574 arrived – a final rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation?
Quiet hour: A special ‘quiet hour’ briefing for all personnel took place at Lakenheath the day before Reach 4574 landed.
Infrastructure upgrade: Concurrent with the deployment of new F-35A aircraft at Lakenheath and the B61-12 nuclear weapon upgrade, nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath has been upgraded.
In the light of this evidence Nukewatch UK considers that B61-12 nuclear weapons were brought to Lakenheath on flight Reach 4574 on 17 July 2025.
ADS-B Exchange
FlightRadar 24
Airplanes.Live
Airframes.io
LiveATC
The increase in warhead numbers announced in the recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy has already commenced and may even be nearing completion, according to an analysis by Nukewatch of nuclear warhead convoy journeys conducted over the last decade.
In March 2021, as part of the Integrated Review, the government announced that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. Nukewatch has prepared a technical note to explain the announcement in the Integrated Review in the light of our monitoring of warhead convoy movements between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and serviced, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot in Coulport in Scotland, whether they are stored.
Our analysis shows that in the first part of the decade (2010 – 2015) there was a slow but steady reduction in numbers of warheads in the UK warhead stockpile held at Coulport. However, from 2015-6 onwards this trend is reversed, and there has been a net transfer of warheads from AWE to Coulport, resulting in an increase in the stockpile held by the Royal Navy. There has been a marked upturn in the rate of delivery of warheads from AWE to Coulport over the past two years, 2019 and 2020.
Nukewatch believes the initial reduction in warhead numbers can be explained by measures to bring the UK warhead stockpile to below 180, as pledged in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review by the then Conservative – Liberal Democrat government. From around 2015/16 AWE commenced delivery of the Mk4A upgrade of the UK Trident warhead to the Royal Navy, and increases in the stockpile observed since 2015-16 represent deliveries of newly manufactured Mk4A warheads. Assuming a 2010 baseline of 225 warheads in the stockpile, on the basis of our assessment Nukewatch estimates that the UK warhead stockpile had grown to around 250 warheads by December 2020.
Read the full details here.
Nukewatch has welcomed aspects of a Scottish Government review of the preparedness of the civil authorities in Scotland to respond effectively to an incident involving the transportation by road of UK nuclear warheads, but is still far from reassured.
Following the publication of the Nukewatch Report “Unready Scotland” which highlighted the dangers of the traffic and the poor level of awareness and readiness at local authority level, Mark Ruskell MSP initiated a members’ debate in Holyrood in May 2018. At the conclusion of the debate Annabelle Ewing, the then Minister for Community Safety, indicated her intention to ask the Police and Fire and Rescue Services to conduct a preparedness review., after making the point that reassurance was necessary. The report on this review is now available.
For Nukewatch Jane Tallents said:
“We are glad to see that the review exercise has been very broad in its scope, has prompted a good deal of agency awareness of the problem, has already led to the tightening of some procedures and prompted helpful recommendations. We cannot help but note that such a review would not have happened without persistent pressure over the years from Nukewatch and the support of individual parliamentarians.
There are however a number of critical flaws in the review. The agencies concerned have been all too ready to accept without due diligence statements from the UK Ministry of Defence, without engaging with other recognised expertise, as we had recommended. This is especially true on the question of risk assessment. The MoD’s single factor risk assessment – that the likelihood of an incident is remote is accepted without any mention of the second factor in any standard risk assessment, the potential severity of consequence. The review also fails to register adequately the unique hazards posed by the transport, and relies too heavily on generic emergency responses.
There is also no mention of the increase in public concern about the convoys. For those living near Faslane/Coulport there is the Clyde Emergency plan which at least gives basic information to the public about how to act in case of an incident. Also, fixed nuclear sites are governed by the REPPIR regulations. Astonishingly, the review does not deal with the fact that no such such framework exists for the convoys. Members of the public who are aware of the convoys need practical information about what to do in the case of an actual accident to keep them and their families safe. This review does not give this information or indicate where it might be found or accessed.
It is most disappointing that Ash Denham, the current Minister, has endorsed the review in her introduction and given the false impression that all is well. The Scottish Government has a prime responsibility for the safety of citizens and must recognise that this case is far from closed.”
A post exercise report from the Director of the MOD convoy accident exercise Astral Climb in 2016 reveals that the scenario used was unrealistic and the whole exercise appeared more about ticking boxes than testing any preparedness to protect the public.
This nuclear transport emergency response exercise was conducted on Wed 22 June 2016 at the closed Longannet Power Station, Fife in Scotland.
The Directors report was obtained under a Freedom Of Information request submitted 30.3.2017 and received 24.5.2019 and it states that “The exercise was planned to test and demonstrate the Command and Control activities of the MOD Road Convoy Immediate Response Force (IRF) and to demonstrate their integration with the responding Civilian Emergency Services (CES).”
Exercise Planning was led by Nuclear Emergency Organisation & supported by AWE staff and planning meetings were held with the Scottish Multi Agency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU).
The scenario was that a convoy having been diverted from its usual route (presumably the A1) is on the A199. As it approaches the junction with the A198 the driver of an HGV loses control and emerges from the junction into the path on the oncoming convoy. It collides with the third warhead carrier. 2 private cars and a small van were also involved.
This location is on a side road parallel to and about 50m from the A1 between West Barns and East Linton to the West of Dunbar. To our knowledge the convoy has never been on this road. The prevailing wind would conveniently blow any radioactive release across a few fields and out to sea. There are very few dwellings in the area although any change of wind direction would send a radioactive cloud over East Linton, Dunbar and a number of small villages in the area. The convoy travels through heavy traffic and urban areas on motorways. Why wasn’t the scenario an accident on the M74 in Glasgow, or the M9 in Stirling or the Edinburgh city bypass so that protecting and warning large numbers of people could be tested?
Although in the scenario the warhead is “disrupted” and partially explodes causing a release of radiation the Directors report states that “It was accepted by all agencies participating that the energy involved in such a collision would not be sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material and that the scenario was only being used to facilitate play”.
If the purpose of an exercise is to test the response to a nuclear warhead convoy accident then using a scenario that they can claim would not release radiation seems to show more concern for reducing negative publicity than protecting the public.
Even though the scenario being “played” was with a radioactive release there then appears to be no further reference to it apart from some people going on a Radioactive Materials Emergency Response Course in advance and that “The convoy decontamination was thorough. CES were processed as well as convoy personel”. There is no mention of protection of the public ie no efforts to warn people to shelter and take cover, or evacuate residents from the emergency zone. It’s not clear what modelling was done as part of the exercise to predict how the radioactive plume would spread.
The report says some responders were wearing just a paper face mask and that contamination levels close to the truck would be too high for this to be effective. However, the next point states that there are problems with communications when personnel have to wear respirators. There is no mention of whether members of the public ie casualties were given any kind of protection.
Command and control was established within 40 minutes: this seems a bit of a long time given that the convoy control vehicle is more or less on scene from the start.
Scottish Fire and Rescue deployed within 26 minutes – this sounds pretty good but we have no idea how far they had to travel or the extent to which they were pre-notified.
There were the usual problems with communications. The police couldn’t understand the convoy commander due to the respirator. Some previous problems were solved by giving the convoy crew a Scottish fire service radio.
Restrictions on the use of radios was not adequately briefed. This this could potentially be a serious issue. Mobile phones are banned in explosives handling areas (eg RAF Welford) as they are a detonation risk. There is research from the US that when nuclear weapons are fire damaged electric currents can flow through them in all kind of weird ways, so this may potentially be a safety concern if it could trigger the explosive to go off.
The MoD Co-ordinating Authority Executive Team were prepositioned before the exercise. This is the main source of MoD expertise on site for dealing with an accident. Given that it took them around 5 hours to get the team up from Bath for Senator 11, prepositioning the team is ‘cheating’ in a big way and raises a very serious question about how realistic the exercise was.
It does not appear that any actual nuclear warhead convoy vehicles were present at the exercise. An HGV and some cars were used losing any sense of a real situation with a 23 vehicle convoy with some uniquely constructed vehicles included.
Although the main objective was demonstrating a satisfactory response and the secondary objective was to provide training, at times it reads more like the exercises was mainly a training activity for Emergency Services than an assessed challenge.
Conclusion from Nukewatch
The MOD are now conducting nuclear weapons convoy accident exercises which don’t even pretend to test any measures to protect the public from a radiation release. In the past more realistic exercise scenarios still stopped short of actual evacuation and sheltering of the public but at least played out on paper how that might be done. For Astral Climb 2016 the MOD imagined a convoy on a back road (it never uses) nowhere near any population centres and they involved police and fire officers without even having any convoy vehicles present at the exercise. Nukewatch can only conclude that the MOD itself realise that a robust test of emergency procedures would always show that the public would be put at risk and therefore they have moved to an annual box ticking exercise with the minimum of information being released to the public.
The Scottish Government which observed this exercise and the Emergency Services that took part should be calling for more transparency about arrangements for protecting the public and speaking out if those are not in place. The scenarios for future exercises should be set by the regulators and civil emergency services to ensure that they are realistic and challenging. Of course the best way to protect the public is to stop transporting nuclear warheads on our roads altogether.
The convoy that had been in Burghfield since Thurs May 9th left on the morning of Wed May 15th. It headed east on the M4, around the M25 and then north on the A1. After a break at RAF Wittering it continued up the A1 and into RAF Leeming late afternoon.
It was spotted the following morning, Wed May 16th, at Scotch corner heading north on the A1 but then took the A69 across country to Carlisle. Taking its usual route up the M74, M73, M80, M9 and A811 it arrived at Coulport in early evening. You can see a film of the full convoy here.
Leaving Coulport on May 21st unusually late at lunchtime it headed back via Stirling and down the M74 and was spotted on the M6 near Penrith in the evening.
It returned to Burghfield late evening/overnight May 22/23
A nuclear weapons convoy set off from AWE Burghfield on the morning of Tues March 19th and headed west on the M4 and then north on the A34. It pulled off onto the slip road at Didcot where the warhead carriers and their security escort were parked for 15 minutes. Other support vehicles went to the nearby services. See a report about it in the Oxford Mail
It then continued on the A34, M40 and A43 to join the M1 north. It was later spotted on the A1 near Aberford.
The following day March 20th the convoy was picked up in Scotland on the M74 at Abington in mid afternoon. It then went north on the M73, M80 and M9 to Stirling then via the A811 to RNAD Coulport.
These vehicles left again on March 26th but individually and not in full convoy formation.
Two new vehicles were spotted in this convoy:
OSU van – white with blue/yellow checkers on side, no side windows, Iveco make, seen in front of the main convoy.
Green / khaki large coach – seen in rear support convoy near usual silver / mauve coach. The usual Renault big workshop van with decontamination trailer was not seen so presumed to have been replaced by the new coach.
