NukewatchUK

Hazard warning labels are visible on this MoD High Security Vehicle photographed in 2011. The labels are no longer carried by replacement vehicles.

 

A secret decision to exempt Ministry of Defence (MoD) nuclear transport arrangements from hazard warning legislation has been revealed as a result of questioning by Members of Parliament.

Ministers have admitted that it is “not current Ministry of Defence policy” to display radioactive material hazard signs on the special trucks used to transport military special nuclear materials or nuclear warheads. Until recently MoD vehicles transporting special nuclear materials carried hazard warning signs when transporting radioactive cargoes, but this policy has now been quietly abandoned.

MoD claims that the change is needed to maintain its policy to ‘neither conform nor deny’ the presence of nuclear weapons at a particular location – but campaigners claim that the department is placing nuclear secrecy before measures the protection of public safety.

The change in practice was disclosed in the reply to a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asked by Labour MP Paul Flynn.

Further questions from the Scottish National Party’s Owen Thompson have revealed that a decision to cease displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials was made by the Defence Equipment and Support organisation in July 2011.

Penny Mordaunt, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, said that the change was implemented in 2012 in anticipation of the transition to a single type of vehicle for the transport of both nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials and was needed “in order to maintain the policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons”

The Minister claimed that MoD’s arrangements for the transport of defence nuclear materials “include the provision of information to the emergency services in the event of an incident; this does not rely on displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs”.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch warned that under the new arrangements public safety was taking second place to secrecy.

“Although the Ministry of Defence say they inform police when nuclear convoys are on the road, they have repeatedly refused to tell fire services, the ambulance service, or local council emergency planners about convoy movements”, she said.

“If one of these convoys is involved in an accident, would fire-fighters
arriving first on the scene have to wait until police turned up to find out that they were dealing with a highly hazardous radioactive cargo rather than a
normal road traffic accident?

“Although some members of the convoy crew are trained as medics and fire-fighters, their priority is looking after the convoy and its weapons, not the public.

“The Ministry of Defence is putting secrecy about its nuclear weapons
before the safety of the general public, who it is supposed to be protecting. That can never be right”.

Throughout most of the 1990s and 2000s special nuclear materials, nuclear warhead components, and other sensitive loads were carried by special ‘High Security Vehicles’ operated by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As civilian vehicles, these were obliged to comply with hazard warning regulations and carry warning signs when transporting radioactive materials, explosives, or hazardous chemicals.

Over the same period nuclear weapons were transported separately in their own vehicles by the armed forces, who were able to claim exemption from displaying hazard warnings on their vehicles.

In the mid-2000s the transport of all nuclear cargoes, both special nuclear materials and warheads, was contracted out by MoD to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and both cargoes are now carried by a single type of vehicle – the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Mark 3 lorry. The TCHD trucks are operated by AWE, acting in the capacity of a civilian haulier which would not normally be exempt from hazard labelling regulations.

Despite ministerial policy that MoD should operate to safety standards at least as good as those required by legislation, the department has decided to exempt itself from this area of public protection legislation.

MoD has said that legal advice was sought and the regulator was notified before the decision to cease displaying hazard warning signs was made.

Nukewatch has published our analysis of nuclear weapons convoy movements for the year 2014 (available to download below).

We consider that during 2014 at least three loaded convoys travelled between the Coulport nuclear arms depot in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield in Berkshire, and two loaded convoys travelled in the opposite direction.  We estimate that between two and twelve nuclear warheads were dispatched to AWE and between two and eight warheads returned to Coulport.  Our best guess is that nine warheads were dispatched to AWE and six were returned to Coulport.

The overall picture of convoy movements during the year represents a similar level of activity than over the last year and is consistent with general observations over the past three to four years.  The level of convoy activity continues to remain consistent with the baseline necessary to allow the movement of nuclear weapons for maintenance and surveillance purposes, with a slow rate of return of warheads to AWE for decommissioning.

Convoy exercise activities are also thought to have taken place frequently throughout the year.  This is a higher number of exercises than in recent previous years, and may be the result of training required to introduce new convoy personnel members or escort arrangements, or preparation for an increase in the tempo of convoy operations over the months ahead.

 

Download the 2014 warhead movements log here:

Convoy log 2014

Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead arsenal continue at a baseline level and suggest that decommissioning of warheads from the Trident warhead stockpile is slowly taking place, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements for the year 2013 published by the Nukewatch network (available to download at the bottom of this article).

Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for decommissioning around three warheads per year between 2011 and 2025 to bring the UK’s total warhead stockpile down from around 225 warheads to around 180 warheads, as the government committed to do in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

However, Nukewatch stresses that sustained monitoring over future years will be necessary to confirm this.

Nukewatch is a network of individuals which monitors the UK’s nuclear weapons programme by observing the road transport of nuclear weapons, and has been watching and tracking warhead convoys for over 25 years.

The group considers that during 2013 at least two ‘live’ warhead convoys travelled between the Coulport nuclear arms depot in Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield in Berkshire, most likely dispatching four warheads to AWE for maintenance, surveillance, or decommissioning, and returning two warheads to Coulport.

Britain’s nuclear warheads are moved on a regular cycle between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the South of England, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, where warheads are stored prior to deployment on Britain’s Trident submarines. By observing this cycle, it is possible to draw inferences about the level of activity of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme

Nukewatch reports that the overall picture of convoy movements during the year represents a slightly lower level of activity than over the last year, but is consistent with a minimum baseline level observed over the past few years. During the 1990s and early 2000s warheads were transported across the country on a far more regular basis as the Trident programme was implemented and older warheads were returned to AWE for decommissioning.

As well as ‘live’ convoy movements, Nukewatch notes that convoy exercises and training activities also took place during 2013, and a number of special nuclear materials convoys were observed.

 

2013 TCHD WARHEAD CONVOY LOG

Cargoes of highly radioactive military nuclear materials are being transported along British roads in ageing Ministry of Defence (MoD) trucks which are regularly experiencing breakdowns and safety shortfalls because of delays in arranging for new vehicles to take over their duties.

Papers released under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that MoD is continuing to use special High Security Vehicles which are over 20 years old to transport military special nuclear materials to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire, where the UK’s nuclear weapons and fuel for nuclear powered submarines are manufactured, even though the vehicles were scheduled to have been replaced in 2010.

A log of safety incidents provided to Nukewatch by the Ministry of Defence in response to a Freedom of Information request reveals that the vehicles have suffered a series of breakdowns and faults since 2010.

In November 2010 a special nuclear materials convoy was forced to return to AWE Aldermaston after setting out because the clutch of the High Security Vehicle in the convoy kept slipping as a result of “wear and tear”. The convoy set out again later the same day with a replacement truck substituting for the defective vehicle.

On another convoy run in November 2012 the alternator on one of the vehicles failed. The convoy was diverted to a nearby Ministry of Defence establishment for repairs, resulting in a 50 minute delay to the journey.

Other faults were experienced in December 2010 when a tail lift failed to operate, in November 2011 when a vehicle suffered a minor fuel leak while on the road, and in June 2012 when a flat battery required a vehicle to be slave started. Each of the faults resulted in a “minor delay” to convoy journeys.

The problems have occurred despite “comprehensive HSV servicing and maintenance routines” which, according to a monthly status brief on the project to replace the vehicles, are now necessary “to minimise risk of breakdown / malfunction”.

The MoD fleet of two High Security Vehicles for the transport of special nuclear materials consists of two H-registered Seddon Atkinson vehicles which entered into service in 1991.

An assessment undertaken by MoD in 2006 indicated that the vehicles would reach the end of their operating life in 2009 – itself an extension of an out of service date previously estimated as 2003. The assessment stated that the vehicles would become “increasingly unsupportable” if operated beyond 2009.

A year later the MoD’s Nuclear Movements Integrated Project Team decided to adopt a new solution for the transport of special nuclear material containers: shipment on special pallets in another fleet of specialized vehicles built to carry nuclear warheads. The new arrangements were scheduled for “full operating capability” by October 2010, allowing the High Security Vehicles to be withdrawn from service soon afterwards.

The decision to use warhead transporters in the new role was taken despite a warning in the 2006 assessment that “the combined vehicle approach does not provide a practicable solution for a replacement HSV” because of access issues at military bases, practicalities of materials movement timetables, and MoD policy that the two types of convoy should appear different.

Delays in the programme to withdraw the High Security Vehicles from service appear to have resulted from setbacks in the preparation and approval of safety cases required to allow new vehicles designed to carry nuclear warheads to take over the transport of special nuclear material cargoes.

The Ministry of Defence has stated that the out of service date for the High Security Vehicle “depends on a number of factors” and is current;y expected to be “around late 2014 to early 2015”.

The two High Security Vehicles regularly transport special nuclear materials – plutonium, tritium, and highly enriched uranium – and nuclear warhead components between the two Atomic Weapons Establishment sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire. They also transport highly enriched uranium pellets for use in submarine reactor fuel from Aldermaston to a factory operated by Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd in Derby where fuel modules for Astute class nuclear powered submarines are manufactured.

The vehicles are also used to deliver radioactive materials and components provided by the USA to Aldermaston from RAF Brize Norton – the airhead to which they are flown across the Atlantic.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch, which monitors nuclear warhead convoys and campaigns against their risks, said: “It’s very clear that, as a result of bureaucracy and incompetence in the Ministry of Defence, deadly cargoes of highly radioactive materials are being driven round the country in unreliable, antiquated vehicles which cannot be guaranteed to deliver them safely to their destination.

“The military regularly tell the public that their nuclear programmes operate to the highest safety standards, but the evidence here shows that this is far from being the case”.

“Members of the public driving on Britain’s roads are being placed at unnecessary risk because of the irresponsibility of the admirals and civil servants responsible for running the MoD’s nuclear programme properly”.

Brake failures, vehicle breakdowns, false alarms, and map-reading errors are among dozens of safety incidents which have plagued convoys carrying nuclear weapons and military special nuclear materials on Britain’s roads over the last seven years, according to documents released under the Freedom of Information Act.

70 individual safety incidents involving the convoy were recorded by the Ministry of Defence over the period between July 2007 to December 2012, according to records provided to Nukewatch by the Ministry following the request. 56 of these were classed as ‘engineering incidents’ and the remaining 14 as ‘operational incidents’.

Convoys of Trident nuclear warheads travel by road several times each year between the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire, where they are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport on Loch Long in the west of Scotland, where they are stored and loaded onto Trident submarines. Special nuclear materials – plutonium, tritium, and highly enriched uranium and components fabricated from these materials for use in the UK’s nuclear weapons and submarine programmes – are also transported less frequently to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment.

The most visible of the incidents recorded occurred on Monday 25 July 2011, when a convoy command vehicle broke down near Junction 20 of the M6 motorway in Cheshire late in the afternoon.

According to the convoy commander’s report, the vehicle “suffered a sudden and dramatic loss of power and was forced to pull onto the hard shoulder of the motorway together with the rest of the convoy assets”. The convoy pulled onto the hard shoulder of the motorway for repairs “causing a minor obstruction of the near-side lane”. Although the FOI papers state that the fault took just twenty minutes to repair, a post on the ‘Trucknet‘ chat forum by a trucker who witnessed the breakdown observes that two lanes of the motorway were coned off while the repairs were underway, which “caused about 10 miles of queues”.

The cause of the incident “proved to be somewhat of a mystery” because, although a fuel system failure was suspected as having caused the problem, “the vehicle had been filled prior to the operation and there was no sign of leakage”. Following the incident fuel systems across the vehicle fleet were checked and rectified.

In July 2010 a convoy strayed “unintentionally off route” as the result of an error by the escort commander. Stopping the convoy and rejoining the correct route resulted in a delay of 45 minutes to the journey time. Convoys were regularly re-routed or delayed to avoid road traffic accidents, severe weather, or heavy congestion on the route ahead, and on one occasion in March 2012 a convoy was re-routed “due to proximity of low flying” at a MoD establishment.

On another occasion a fuse box failure left the tractor unit of one warhead carrier truck unusable, requiring a spare unit to be used to complete the journey, and on another occasion the spare tractor itself broke down.

Recurring problems with warhead carrier trailer heat monitor alarms, which were triggered four times on false alerts between September 2011 and December 2012, resulted in the alarm system software needing an upgrade, and problems with ageing vehicle location systems on the warhead carriers also required installation of a replacement system.

As well as trucks carrying the warheads themselves, vehicles in the convoy security escort also suffered problems. In June 2012 a convoy was halted to investigate a “suspension system defect” in one of the armoured escort vehicles which accompany the warhead carriers. During the unplanned stop a manhole cover collapsed underneath a second escort vehicle, requiring a vehicle safety check. During a convoy run in January 2012 a gun port flap on a convoy escort vehicle “opened inadvertently”, and during the same operation a “brake fault” was discovered on a fire tender accompanying the convoy.

Jane Tallents of Nukewatch, which monitors nuclear warhead convoys and campaigns against their risks, said: “Some of the safety incidents on the list provided by the Ministry of Defence were relatively serious and, had bad luck caused events to play out in a different way, could have resulted in harm to motorists or the convoy crew or damage to the deadly cargo being carried by the convoy.

“It only takes a moment’s though to see that, far from being a benign ‘insurance policy’ which keeps the public safe, nuclear weapons actually increase the risks that we all face.
“The Ministry of Defence should not be moving nuclear weapons around the country if it can’t guarantee to do so safely.”