Armed Ministry of Defence police on patrol outside Lakenheath air base on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Following a delivery of nuclear weapons to Lakenheath US air base in Suffolk on 17-18 July 2025, a second Prime Nuclear Airlift force flew to Lakenheath on 24-25 July to delivery a high priority hazardous cargo.
The mission in many ways replicated the previous week’s delivery, with the same aircraft used to delivery the cargo to Lakenheath; a similar schedule; and another spare aircraft on standby at Ramstein US base in Germany. During the primary mission a C-17 aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing flew to Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, where it loaded a cargo on Pad 5 – the section of the airbase designated for handing hazardous cargoes. The aircraft then flew on to Lakenheath to deliver its cargo, remaining there overnight before returning directly to its home base at McChord Air Force Base in Washington state. Please see below for flight details.
Nukewatch was again able to observe the delivery and unloading at Lakenheath on 24 July, although as a result of poor weather and visibility our deductions are qualified. On this occasion, unlike the previous delivery to Lakenheath, armed Ministry of Defence police were on patrol around the outside of the base. The aircraft again unloaded on the Victor Ramp hazardous cargo area. Static security vehicle pickets were located inside the base fence, but in fewer numbers when compared with the previous week, and not in a pronounced semi-circle around the aircraft as before.
US Air Force C-17 aircraft 08-8200 taxiing towards Victor Ramp at Lakenheath air base on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
The aircraft unloading procedure took around two hours, following a period of around one hour after the aircraft landed while it taxied to the ramp and personnel and vehicles assembled before unloading began in earnest. Unloading operations appeared to follow a different format to the previous week. Loads appeared to have been transferred from the aircraft by four to six small convoys consisting of two or three larger vehicles (different to those observed last week) accompanied by a smaller vehicle. A separate vehicle / vehicles regularly shuttled between the aircraft and unloading vehicles throughout the unloading operation.
On the second day (Friday 25 July) security arrangements at the base and around the aircraft were noticeably more relaxed. Activities continued around the aircraft, including possibly some unloading or loading, and also refuelling before the aircraft departed early in the afternoon.
Nukewatch concludes the following:
A high security unloading operation for hazardous materials took place at Lakenheath.
The operation seemed to follow slightly different procedures to the one observed the previous week.
Nevertheless, the degree of security and general circumstances of the flight seem to indicate that a nuclear-related load was probably delivered in the aircraft. This may have been components and equipment related to nuclear weapons, or possibly weapons themselves.
Between four to six loads seemed to be transported away from the aircraft in small convoys to a location on the airbase nearby.
Assuming two or three transporting vehicles in each convoy, and each convoy carried one nuclear bomb, this suggests that between around 8 and 18 ‘units’ of cargo were delivered by this flight.
Flight schedules
(all times British Summer Time)
Main aircraft: C-17 08-8200, flight number RCH4574
Tuesday 22 July:
15.45: Departure from McChord Air Force Base.
18:14: Arrival at Kirtland Air Force Base and cargo loading.
Wednesday 23 July:
23:48: Departure from Kirtland Air Force Base followed by refuelling over West Atlantic.
Thursday 24 July:
10:08: Arrival at Lakenheath Air Base and cargo unloading.
Friday 25 July:
13:39: Departure from Lakenheath Air Base.
23:54: Arrival at McChord Air Force Base.
Standby aircraft: C-17 09-9211, flight number RCH4134
22 July 2025:
22.03: Departure from McChord Air Force Base.
23 July 2024:
08:03: Arrival at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
24 July 2025:
15:45: Departure from Ramstein Air Base.
25 July 2025:
02:23: Arrival at McChord AFB.
Images
Flight path of C-17 08-8200 across the UK on Thursday 24 July. Image: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.
Personnel and vehicles mustering around the aircraft before unloading on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Vehicles unloading aircraft on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Security vehicle on patrol at Lakenheath air base, 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
US nuclear bombs were delivered to Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July as part of NATO plans to deploy new battlefield nuclear nuclear weapons intended for war-fighting in Europe.
A United States Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft prepares to unload nuclear weapons at Lakenheath air base on Thursday 17 July. Credit: Nukewatch UK
The flight
The arrival of a special flight transporting the bombs was observed by Nukewatch UK, who judge that the evidence publicly available from our observations and flight-tracking data now supports the conclusion that nuclear weapons are based at the Lakenheath US air base in Suffolk. This article explains how the weapons were brought to Lakenheath by the US Air Force and sets out the evidence which indicates they are now stationed at the British base.
Shortly after 7 am local time on Tuesday 15 July a giant C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, flight number RCH4574 (‘Reach 4574’), assigned to the US Air Force’s 62nd Airlift Wing left Joint Base Lewis–McChord, its home base in Washington state. The 62nd Airlift Wing is an elite, highly trained transport unit which serves as the US Air Force’s Prime Nuclear Airlift Force: the only Air Force section tasked with the role of supporting the US Department of Defence and Department of Energy with their nuclear airlift operations. The aircraft undertaking the flight was a C-17 with the serial number 08-8200, flying on high priority mission with the air force mission number PAM112271196.
The aircraft flew across the continental United States to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico – the hub of the US Air Force’s nuclear operations, where the largest nuclear weapons storage facility in the world is located: the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). KUMMSC stores a significant portion of the US nuclear arsenal, including gravity bombs and warheads.
At Kirtland the aircraft almost certainly loaded up with a cargo of anything up to 20 newly manufactured B61-12 nuclear weapons – a new, modernised version of the US Air Force’s principal nuclear gravity bomb with greater accuracy than older variants of the weapon. Manufacturing of the B61-12 variant was completed in December 2024 and the weapon is currently being rolled out on deployment. Whilst at Kirtland the aircraft was parked on Pad 5 – the section of the airbase designated for handling hazardous cargoes. Other aircraft at the airport were given a warning not to overfly the aircraft on Pad 5 for a period of over five hours, which ended only once the C-17 had departed.
Mid evening local time on Wednesday 16 July Reach 4574 took off, with the pilot reminding the ground controller that the aircraft has “haz cargo” on board. The aircraft flew through the night across the Atlantic Ocean, rendezvousing with two KC-46 tanker aircraft from Pease Air National Guard Base and McGuire Air Force Base to refuel over the ocean east of New York.
In a co-ordinated operation, a second C-17 aircraft (aircraft number 09-9211, flight number RCH4205, mission number PAM112472196) also left Lewis-McChord on 15 July and flew to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany (stopping briefly at Lakenheath) to be on standby in the event of a failure or emergency involving the primary aircraft. This standby aircraft may have been loaded with nuclear emergency response equipment for dealing with an accident involving the primary aircraft.
Reach 4574 approached the UK flying south of Ireland, then flew up the Bristol Channel, cut across north Devon, and flew north west along a corridor taking it close to Oxford and Milton Keynes, but avoiding overflying major centres of population. The plane landed at Lakenheath air base at 12.50 local time.
Unloading the bombs
Nukewatch UK was able to observe the aircraft landing and unloading from outside the Lakenheath base. During the unloading operation base security was at an unusually high level, with USAF security patrols and police cars undertaking patrols inside the base’s security fence and plain-clothed (but badged) personnel from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations patrolling outside the base.
After landing the aircraft taxied to an area of the airbase known as ‘Victor Ramp’ – a location towards the centre of the base which is one of the areas designated for loading and unloading hazardous cargoes. During the entire unloading operation the aircraft was accompanied by a US Air Force fire tender, stationed alongside the right wing of the aircraft, and the tender also did a sweep along the runway before the aircraft landed. Security vehicles surrounded the unloading area and a number of vehicles approached the aircraft for the unloading operation, deploying close to its rear drop-down ramp. Following unloading a convoy of several vehicles moved very slowly with red lights flashing to a protected aircraft shelter near the unloading area and disappeared from sight behind the shelter. Among the vehicles seen unloading the aircraft were MHU83 Aircraft Aerial Munitions Lift Trucks, used by the US Air Force for loading and unloading munitions from aircraft, and certified for use with nuclear weapons.
Whilst Reach 4574 was at Lakenheath no other flights flew from the base and a strict ‘no fly’ restriction was in place for a 2.5 nautical mile radius around the base in the Lakenheath Aerodrome Traffic Zone area. The aircraft departed from Lakenheath at the end of the afternoon on Friday 18 July and flew straight back to Lewis-McChord.
Photos of flight Reach 4574 landing at Lakenheath and unloading its cargo accompany this article (please see below). Nukewatch UK believes that this C-17 aircraft was transporting a batch of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion are given below.
US nuclear weapons in Europe
Lakenheath air base is no stranger to nuclear weapons, and hosts F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning aircraft, both of which are certified to carry B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. During much of the Cold War nuclear weapons were stored at Lakenheath but in 2008 they were quietly removed from the base following consolidation of the US nuclear arsenal in Europe. Since 2022 nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath, including hardened aircraft shelters and a ‘surety dormitory’, has been upgraded, giving rise to speculation that nuclear weapons would be returning to Suffolk.
The 62nd Airlift Wing regularly conducts Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions across the Atlantic to transport materials and equipment to air bases in Europe which support NATO’s nuclear mission in Europe, under which B61 bombs are stored at US bases in Europe and bases of European nations which take part in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements with the US. Nukewatch has been actively tracking these flights for three years, and has used archived tracking data to analyse flights since the beginning of 2020. Over this period missions have included occasional operations which have been unusually complex, involving up to seven aircraft as stand-bys and for in-flight refuelling. In addition to operations involving nuclear weapons, the unit also conducts missions transporting special nuclear materials which visit several NATO nuclear bases in Europe in sequence, and also conducts missions involving training with ground personnel at several nuclear bases.
It is possible that the earliest of these missions were training and rehearsal flights for the delivery of new B61-12 nuclear bombs to Europe, with more recent flights actually transporting the nuclear bombs across the Atlantic for deployment at bases in Europe. Nukewatch has observed that Lakenheath has been involved in many of these missions, initially as a location for basing a stand-by aircraft in Europe – possibly for use by a nuclear emergency response team. More recently Lakenheath appears to have been involved in a series of ‘work up’ exercises and security drills involving aircraft from 62 Airlift Wing to prepare the base for the arrival of nuclear weapons, culminating in a large-scale exercise over two days on 10 – 11 June 2025 which may have been a dress rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation. This chart gives an indication of the frequency of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force missions to Europe since 2020:
Schematic schedule ofUS Air Force Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to NATO nuclear bases in Europe since 2020.
B61s: Transport of B61 nuclear weapons.
SNM: Special Nuclear Materials (Tritium)
T&E: Training and evaluation
Source: Observations and deductions by Nukewatch UK.
The day before flight Reach 4574 landed Lakenheath air base held a ‘quiet hour’ from 09.00 – 10.00 am – a session where all base personnel are briefed by senior officers on important matters. It is likely that the briefing took place to inform staff at the base that Lakenheath had been formally ‘stood up’ for its nuclear role and to explain arrangements for the delivery operation the next day.
It can be expected that Prime Nuclear Airlift Force flights to Lakenheath and other European nuclear weapons bases will continue on a regular basis for the foreseeable future. These flights are necessary to deliver materials required for the B61-12 nuclear programme (for example tritium, a radioactive gas involved in boosting a nuclear explosion which has a relatively short half-life and needs regular replenishment); to transport loads to and from the US for servicing and maintenance; and for emergency, security, and crew training exercises.
It is important to understand that the delivery of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath has nothing to do with the recent announcement by the Prime Minister that the UK will purchase a small number of F-35A nuclear-capable aircraft for the Royal Air Force. The UK has not yet purchased these aircraft and a long period of training and certification would be mandated by the US authorities before the RAF was deemed competent to take part in NATO’s tactical nuclear mission. As yet doctrine and operational arrangements for any RAF nuclear role do not appear to have been developed.
What we think
Speaking on the delivery of US B61-12 nuclear weapons to Lakenheath, Juliet McBride of Nukewatch UK said:
“The new nuclear bombs which are now based at Lakenheath are entirely under the control of Donald Trump and could be used without the UK having any say at all in the matter. In fact, we wonder whether the UK government has even been notified by the US Air Force that the weapons are now stationed at Lakenheath.
“The nuclear weapons now stored at Lakenheath have an explosive power of up to 50 kilotons. For comparison, the atom bomb that devastated Hiroshima in 1945 had an explosive yield of 15 kilotons. Far from protecting Europeans during wartime, these nuclear weapons would contribute to turning Europe into a radioactive wasteland.
“Despite the significant issues and risks involved in basing these weapons of mass destruction in Europe, neither the US nor the UK government have bothered to inform citizens or Parliament that they have been deployed here. Nukewatch UK believes that UK citizens have a right to know that these preparations for fighting a nuclear war are under way, and we will continue to report on nuclear movements to Lakenheath and other European nuclear bases”.
Photographs
Please note: photos were taken from a vantage point outside Lakenheath air base and some distance from the unloading pad, and so images are of limited quality. Unless otherwise stated, images are credited to Nukewatch UK and may only be reproduced for not-for-profit purposes.
1. US Air Force security vehicles on patrol at Lakenheath before the flight arrives. The red X indicates a US security vehicle near the perimeter fence.
2. Flight Reach 4574 arrives at Lakenheath.
3. The aircraft taxis towards the Victor Ramp area where hazardous cargo is handled.
3. Taxiing towards the Victor Ramp area.
4. Moving into position on Victor Ramp.
5. Circling on Victor Ramp.
6. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp.
7. Preparing to unload on Victor Ramp. The red X indicates a fire tender on station in the event of any emergencies.
8. Location of the aircraft in relation to the rest of Lakenheath air base.
9. Chart of Lakenheath air base showing the location of Victor Ramp. The chart is oriented along the axis of the Lakenheath runway. Credit: US Air Force.
10. Flight path taken by Flight 4574 across the UK on 17 July. Credit: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.
11. Sound clip of the dispatcher at Kirtland Air Force Base reading the flight departure clearance for Flight 4574, and stumbling as if surprised over the destination “echo golf uniform lima” (EGUL is the ICAO aircraft code for Lakenheath).
12. Sound clip of the pilot of Flight 4574 announcing to the ground controller at Kirtland Air Force Base that the aircraft is moving from Pad 5 to take off with “haz cargo”.
Timeline to touchdown
(All times shown are British Summer Time)
26 October 2022:
‘Politico’ magazine reports that B61-12 nuclear weapon will be rolled out for deployment in Europe from December 2022.
18 December 2024:
B61-12 manufacturing programme complete.
10-11 June 2025:
Major exercise involving aircraft from 62nd Airlift Wing at Lakenheath – a rehearsal for the delivery operation?
Tuesday 15 July 2025:
15.19: Reach 4574 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord
17.38: Reach 4574 arrives at Kirtland Air Force Base
22.08: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 leaves Joint Base Lewis-McChord
Wednesday 16 July:
09.00 – 10.00: ‘Quiet hour’ briefing at Lakenheath
09.35: Standby aircraft Reach 4205 arrives at Ramstein Air Base after brief stop at Lakenheath
Thursday 17 July:
02.34: Reach 4574 leaves Kirtland Air Force Base
06.16: In-flight refuelling off the east coast of the USA
12.50: Reach 4547 arrives at Lakenheath
13.00: Aircraft in position on Victor ramp
14.15 Unloading commences.
Friday 18 July
16.22: Reach 4574 leaves Lakenheath
01.48: Reach 4574 arrives at Joint Base Lewis-McChord: mission complete.
Nuclear weapons at Lakenheath – the evidence
Hazardous cargo: Flight Reach 4574 was a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force mission and according to the pilot, it was transporting hazardous cargo.
High security operation: During the arrival and unloading of Reach 4574 Lakenheath air base was at a heightened level of security, with frequent security and police patrols inside the perimeter wire and US Air Force Office of Special Investigations personnel on duty outside.
No fly zone: No flights were permitted to or from Lakenheath air base while Reach 4574 was on the ground, and flying was not permitted within a radius of 2.5 nautical miles of the base.
Aircraft unloading: Cargo was unloaded from Reach 4574 with great care and was transported carefully away from the aircraft at slow speed.
Rehearsal exercise: A two day exercise involving a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force aircraft took place at Lakenheath five weeks before Reach 4574 arrived – a final rehearsal for the nuclear delivery operation?
Quiet hour: A special ‘quiet hour’ briefing for all personnel took place at Lakenheath the day before Reach 4574 landed.
Infrastructure upgrade: Concurrent with the deployment of new F-35A aircraft at Lakenheath and the B61-12 nuclear weapon upgrade, nuclear-related infrastructure at Lakenheath has been upgraded.
In the light of this evidence Nukewatch UK considers that B61-12 nuclear weapons were brought to Lakenheath on flight Reach 4574 on 17 July 2025.
Movements of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons increased significantly in 2016 when compared with recent years which suggests that modernised warheads are being introduced into service, according to an annual summary of warhead convoy movements published by Nukewatch (available to download at the bottom of this article).
Evidence from convoy movements observed by Nukewatch is consistent with a programme for loading the first batch of newly modernised warheads on board the Trident submarine HMS Vengeance, which re-entered service during 2016 following a three year refit.
Nukewatch considers that during 2016 at least six loaded convoys travelled between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield and the Coulport arms depot in Scotland, and at least five loaded convoys travelled in the opposite direction. These are believed to have delivered a total of up to 34 refurbished warheads to Coulport and returned 28 warheads to AWE for modernisation.
Although the total number of convoy movements during the year is similar to the past four to five years, the number of convoys carrying nuclear weapons has more than doubled when compared to previous years, with a corresponding reduction in the number of training exercises.
The pattern of convoy movements observed is consistent with an operation to return warheads equivalent to a single submarine’s complement to AWE for refurbishment. In December 2015 the Trident submarine HMS Vanguard entered Devonport dockyard for a three year refit, prior to which nuclear weapons would have been unloaded from the submarine. At the same time HMS Vengeance left Devonport following a refit, and re-entered service soon after completing a controversial Trident missile test-firing in June 2016, during which an unarmed missile had to be destroyed mid-flight.
Convoy movements suggest that over the first half of the year enough warheads were refurbished by AWE to allow HMS Vengeance to re-enter service in the second half of the year with a largely, if not fully, refurbished complement of warheads.
Production of the modernised and upgraded UK Trident Mark 4A was scheduled to have commenced sometime in 2015 and Nukewatch considers that the convoy movements observed in the first part of 2016 represented an operation to move the first of the Mark 4A upgraded warheads to Coulport prior to loading onto HMS Vengeance.
Over the period 2011 – 2014 a surplus of warheads was returned to AWE when compared with the numbers delivered to Coulport. Nukewatch considers that this is evidence that Trident warheads have been decommissioned at a slow rate in line with a commitment to reduce the number of UK nuclear warheads which was announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Over the last two years this trend has ceased and it appears that there has been a suspension of warhead decommissioning work.
Britain’s nuclear warheads are moved on a regular cycle between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the South of England, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are manufactured and maintained, and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, where warheads are stored prior to deployment on Britain’s Trident submarines. By observing this cycle, it is possible to draw inferences about the level of activity of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme. However, Nukewatch stresses that their figures can only represent an estimate of the true picture.
Jane Tallents of Nukewatch said: “The pattern of warhead convoy movements which we saw last year paints an alarming picture. The evidence suggests that not only are there a greater number of these deadly cargoes on the roads, but that the government is introducing modernised and even more lethal Trident warheads into service.
“While the rest of the world is meeting at the United Nations to draw up a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons, the UK government is unilaterally and illegally modernising its weapons of mass destruction”.
Download annual logs of convoy movements for 2015 and 2016 here:
Convoys which transport the UK’s Trident nuclear warheads have been involved in a series of collisions, breakdowns, and equipment failures, according to a new report by an award-winning journalist.
According to previously unpublished information revealed in response to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act, convoys transporting defence nuclear materials and warheads were involved in 24 ‘operational incidents’ and 19 ‘engineering incidents’ over the period January 2013 to July 2016.
Over this period the convoy was involved in three minor collisions: twice in May 2013, when two convoy vehicles collided with each other and when a convoy escort vehicle collided with a parked civilian vehicle, and again in January 2014, when an escort vehicle collided with a car at a Ministry of Defence (MoD) base during a rest stop.
In September 2015 one of the trucks which transports nuclear weapons lost power and broke down soon after leaving a military site, and convoy escort vehicles twice broke down and were declared unserviceable during convoy journeys in November 2013 and July 2015. Adverse weather affected convoy journeys in November 2013, forcing a route change, and in January 2014, when a rolling police blockade was set up to safeguard the convoy during snowy conditions, and the convoy was stopped by protesters on three occasions.
The new revelations bring the total number of reported safety incidents affecting the nuclear convoy since 2000 to 180. This is in addition to eight accidents which are known to have taken place between 1960 and 1991, the most serious of which occurred in January 1987 when a convoy vehicle carrying nuclear warheads skidded and overturned on an icy road in Wiltshire.
The report lists a series of credible accident scenarios that could trigger fires, explosions or a breach of containment, resulting in the release of plutonium and other radioactive materials from warheads. Evidence cited from an MoD report suggests that in extreme circumstances an accident could even trigger an “inadvertent yield” – a nuclear reaction leading to a large-scale release of radiation short of a full nuclear explosion. A terrorist attack on a nuclear convoy, according to the MoD, could cause “considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function effectively as a sovereign state”.
The report simulates the results of an accident involving a nuclear weapon in five places through which the warhead convoy has travelled: Birmingham, Preston, Wetherby, Newcastle and Glasgow. In each case the people, hospitals, schools, universities, roads, railway stations and airports that could be contaminated and disrupted are identified, assuming that an accident would spread contamination up to ten kilometres from the scene of the crash, depending on which way the wind was blowing.
In Birmingham, for example, a nuclear convoy crash on the M6 at Spaghetti Junction near the city could put more than 1.3 million people at risk of radioactive contamination. Within a ten-kilometre radius there are over 400 schools, 38 railway stations and 18 hospitals that could be disrupted.
The report quotes independent nuclear engineer John Large as warning that a multiple crash and fire involving a warhead carrier would pose a significant – and plausible – risk to the public. “The inclusion of a flammable chemical tanker in the pile-up would add to the ferocity and, particularly if the incident occurred in a longish bridge underpass or similar, fire temperatures would be very demanding on the containment of the warhead carriers,” he said.
If the containment is breached, high explosives could catch fire or explode, he warned. “Once that happens then the enriched uranium and plutonium components will also be consumed by fire and, without effective containment, liberate some very fine plutonium dioxide particles.” The consequences of this would be very hard to mitigate and very long lasting, potentially contaminating significant areas of land and posing long term health impacts.
The report states that although emergency exercises run by the MoD rehearse disaster scenarios in which multiple crashes lead to fires, explosions and the spread of radioactive contamination over cities, post-mortem reports from six exercises reveal that the MoD and the emergency services would have serious difficulties dealing with such disasters. Post-mortems “make the same points year after year”, because many of the same problems keep recurring, suggesting that “lessons are not learnt”, and that “issues with delays, communications and co-ordination are rediscovered every time”, which “does not bode well should there ever be a serious accident”.
A nuclear weapons convoy left AWE Burghfield in Berkshire on the morning of Wednesday 10 February. After an overnight stop in Yorkshire it travelled on into Scotland on the A1, passing Edinburgh and Stirling before arriving at RNAD Coulport at just before 7.00 pm on Thursday 11 February.
The return trip began on the morning of Monday 15 February, with the convoy passing Stirling before travelling along the Edinburgh Bypass, where it was photographed by a number of members of the public before stopping for a rest break at Glencorse Barracks at Penicuik. It then continued along the A1 past Newcastle before stopping overnight again in Yorkshire. The convoy arrived back at AWE Burghfield early evening on Tuesday 16 February.
Hazard warning labels are visible on this MoD High Security Vehicle photographed in 2011. The labels are no longer carried by replacement vehicles.
A secret decision to exempt Ministry of Defence (MoD) nuclear transport arrangements from hazard warning legislation has been revealed as a result of questioning by Members of Parliament.
Ministers have admitted that it is “not current Ministry of Defence policy” to display radioactive material hazard signs on the special trucks used to transport military special nuclear materials or nuclear warheads. Until recently MoD vehicles transporting special nuclear materials carried hazard warning signs when transporting radioactive cargoes, but this policy has now been quietly abandoned.
MoD claims that the change is needed to maintain its policy to ‘neither conform nor deny’ the presence of nuclear weapons at a particular location – but campaigners claim that the department is placing nuclear secrecy before measures the protection of public safety.
The change in practice was disclosed in the reply to a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asked by Labour MP Paul Flynn.
Further questions from the Scottish National Party’s Owen Thompson have revealed that a decision to cease displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials was made by the Defence Equipment and Support organisation in July 2011.
Penny Mordaunt, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, said that the change was implemented in 2012 in anticipation of the transition to a single type of vehicle for the transport of both nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials and was needed “in order to maintain the policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons”
The Minister claimed that MoD’s arrangements for the transport of defence nuclear materials “include the provision of information to the emergency services in the event of an incident; this does not rely on displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs”.
Jane Tallents of Nukewatch warned that under the new arrangements public safety was taking second place to secrecy.
“Although the Ministry of Defence say they inform police when nuclear convoys are on the road, they have repeatedly refused to tell fire services, the ambulance service, or local council emergency planners about convoy movements”, she said.
“If one of these convoys is involved in an accident, would fire-fighters
arriving first on the scene have to wait until police turned up to find out that they were dealing with a highly hazardous radioactive cargo rather than a
normal road traffic accident?
“Although some members of the convoy crew are trained as medics and fire-fighters, their priority is looking after the convoy and its weapons, not the public.
“The Ministry of Defence is putting secrecy about its nuclear weapons
before the safety of the general public, who it is supposed to be protecting. That can never be right”.
Throughout most of the 1990s and 2000s special nuclear materials, nuclear warhead components, and other sensitive loads were carried by special ‘High Security Vehicles’ operated by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As civilian vehicles, these were obliged to comply with hazard warning regulations and carry warning signs when transporting radioactive materials, explosives, or hazardous chemicals.
Over the same period nuclear weapons were transported separately in their own vehicles by the armed forces, who were able to claim exemption from displaying hazard warnings on their vehicles.
In the mid-2000s the transport of all nuclear cargoes, both special nuclear materials and warheads, was contracted out by MoD to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and both cargoes are now carried by a single type of vehicle – the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Mark 3 lorry. The TCHD trucks are operated by AWE, acting in the capacity of a civilian haulier which would not normally be exempt from hazard labelling regulations.
Despite ministerial policy that MoD should operate to safety standards at least as good as those required by legislation, the department has decided to exempt itself from this area of public protection legislation.
MoD has said that legal advice was sought and the regulator was notified before the decision to cease displaying hazard warning signs was made.
The first warhead convoy of the year left AWE Burghfield just after midnight on Saturday 9 January, arriving at RNAD Coulport at around 7.00 pm on the same day. The convoy was followed by Nukewatch up the M40 and on to the A46 past Coventry, and then back on to the motorway network on the M6 to Stafford. The convoy continued north on the M6, stopping to change crew near Preston, and then drove into Scotland on the M74. At Stirling it was greeted by protesters, including students from Stirling University. Despite efforts by police to prevent people from photographing the convoy, a number of members of the public have posted video footage on the internet showing the convoy during its journey.
The return trip took place a week later, with the convoy leaving Coulport at around 10.00 am on Saturday 16 January. It again passed through Stirling and then travelled on the M80 past Glasgow in heavy snow. It arrived back at Burghfield early in the morning on Sunday 17 January.
A nuclear warhead convoy left AWE Burghfield on Wednesday 2nd December at 8.30 am, arriving at RNAD Coulport at around 2.30 am the next morning. Passing through Reading it then travelled East on the M4, subsequently taking the A1(M) to travel northwards.
At 3.25 p.m. Nukewatchers spotted the convoy turning off the A1(M) onto the A61 in North Yorkshire, heading for a break at RAF Leeming which it entered at 3.45 p.m. By 8 p.m. the convoy was observed leaving the A1 onto the A69, 9 minutes later entering Albemarle Barracks in Northumbria (10 miles west of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for another break. Later, continuing West on the A69, the convoy made its way to the M74 and was observed by Nukewatchers at several points on its trip northwards through Scotland. It then took the M8 around the southside of Glasgow where it was caught on video by Scottish CND. After crossing the Erskine Bridge it continued up Loch Lomondside, reaching its destination at around 2.30 am.
The convoy was thought to have returned to the Atomic Weapons Establishment by 11th December.
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Armed Ministry of Defence police on patrol outside Lakenheath air base on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Flight path of C-17 08-8200 across the UK on Thursday 24 July. Image: Screengrab from ADS-B Exchange.
Personnel and vehicles mustering around the aircraft before unloading on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Vehicles unloading aircraft on 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
Security vehicle on patrol at Lakenheath air base, 24 July 2025. Image: Nukewatch UK.
